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Introduction
In one sentence § 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who
“monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize” or “combine or conspire” to
monopolize -- all without explanation.1 Section 1 of the Clayton Act,

*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law
School and the Wharton School. Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp and Jon
Jacobson for comments.
1
15 U.S.C. §2 (2018):
1
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passed a quarter century later, offered a few helpful definitions.2 It
defined “antitrust laws,” “commerce,” and “person” so as to include
corporations. But the definition provision said nothing about the
meaning of “monopolize.” That is, it failed to define the term that was
most important and ultimately became most controversial. No other
federal statute has used so few words to condemn acts that are as
eclectic, diverse, and unspecified as those covered by §2 of the
Sherman Act.
As a result, criticisms that the antitrust statutes are out-of-date
and not up to dealing with dominant digital firms today cannot be
based on readings of the text.3 The text of all of the antitrust statutes,
including §2 of the Sherman Act, is broad enough to reach nearly every
threat to competition that the dominant digital platforms pose. Rather,
decades of narrow construction have led to most of the problems. One
exception is situations in which conduct by a dominant firm threatens
harm falling short of monopoly in a second market. Section 2’s
condemnation of “monopolizing” conduct cannot literally be
construed to reach such behavior. A more networked economy entails
that more practices link two or more different markets, and threats of
competitive harm extend to situations where monopoly is not
realistically threatened in a second market. Here, the United States
would do better to adopt an “abuse of dominance” standard such as the
one used in the EU and other jurisdictions.4
Early case law under §1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibited
agreements in restraint of trade, relied heavily on common law
precedents defining it as decreased output or occasionally as exclusion

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty….
2
15 U.S.C. §12 (2018).
3
E.g., David Streitfeld,To Take Down Big Tech, They First Need to Reinvent
the Law NEW YORK TIMES (June 20, 2019), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/technology/tech-giants-antitrustlaw.html; Tara Lachapelle, 100-Year-Old Antitrust Laws Are No Match for
Big
Tech,
BLOOMBER
(Aug.45,
2020),
available
at
https://www.yahoo.com/now/100-old-antitrust-laws-no-110005376.html.
4
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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of competitors.5 Few such precedents existed, however, for the law of
single-firm monopolization. At common law the term “monopoly”
almost always referred to an exclusive grant or title from the
government.6 Aside from business torts and criminal law, there was
no history of prohibiting purely unilateral conduct not authorized in a
grant from the government.
With so little statutory guidance the courts have wrestled for
more than 130 years with the question of what it means to
“monopolize” – more specifically, what range of firms are subject to
it, and what kinds of conduct does it condemn? Broad agreement has
emerged about two things. First, the conduct addressed by §2 of the
Sherman Act is fundamentally unilateral, even though it is often
carried out by means of a contract. Second, the relevant actor must
have some degree of dominance in its market. Beyond that, the range
of things that can constitute monopolizing conduct is extremely broad
and fluid, as is the range of approaches taken to evaluate it. To make
matters worse, the antitrust statutes say almost nothing about remedies
and never address what type of remedy is best for particular types of
conduct. All of this has been left to federal judges.
Understandably, many of the earliest decisions looked to tort
law, which was preoccupied with conduct but largely unconcerned

5

See Book Review, 28 HARV. L.REV. 642, 643 (1915) (defining common law
restraint of trade as “restriction of output”) (reviewing WILLIAM H. TAFT,
THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914)); Donald Dewey,
The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 778
(1955) (similar); Charles Grove Haines, Efforts to define Unfair Competition,
29 YALE L.J. 1 (1919) (“limitation of output”). See also Philip Marcus,
Antitrust Bugbears: Substitute Products-Oligopoly, 105 UNIV. PA. L. REV.
185, 195 (1956) (agreement among rivals to restrict output was in restraint
of trade); William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act, 68 YALE
L.J. 900, 903 (1959) (same).
6
See Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of
Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman
Act and the Classical Theory of competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1025
(1989). For some of the ambiguity at the time the Sherman Act was passed,
see the discussion of the legislative history in Edward A. Adler,
Monopolizing at Common Law and Under Section Two of the Sherman Act,
31 HARV. L. REV. 246 (1917).
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about the creation or maintenance of monopoly power.7 They
occasionally also found precedent in British statutes dating from the
thirteenth century that applied mainly to agricultural products and that
prevented people from buying up the produce in an area with the
intention of aggregating it and then reselling at a higher price.8 These
statutes, which were mimicked by some states and municipalities in
the United States as late as the early twentieth century,9 contained no
monopoly power requirement. Indeed, their focus was on a form of
fringe criminal activity rather than the acts of dominant firms. For
example, forestallers sometimes interrupted goods heading to market
and, whether by force or by purchase, acquired them and kept them
from being sold in competition.10
Closely related is the question of the boundary between the
antitrust laws and non-antitrust forms of regulation. Keeping these
distinct might seem obvious and critical to lawyers who are regularly
involved in antitrust and other regulatory enterprises. The popular
press, however, often blends antitrust and regulatory concerns with no
apparent awareness of a boundary between them.
Congress
11
occasionally does the same thing.

7

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
See Wendell Herbruck, Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing, 27 Mich.
L. Rev. 365 (1929); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF ENGLAND 149 (1769) (“the buying of corn, or other dead victual, in any
market, and selling it again in the same market, or within four miles of the
place”). See also Edward A. Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and
Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 HARV. L. REV. 246 (1917).
9
E.g., Dutton v. City of Knoxville, 121 Tenn. 25 (1908) (interpreting 1907
charter provision prohibiting forestalling of agricultural products); City of
York v. Hatterer, 48 Pa. Super. 216 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1911) (upholding and
applying municipal ordinance to defendant, who had purchased onions in a
city market with the intention of reselling them in her stand, which was also
in the same market); City of Louisville v Roupe, 45 Ky. 591 (1846) (similar).
10
Herbruck, supra note __ at 370 (“hindering a merchant on the way to the
City by buying his goods.”).
11
E.g., Rachel Sandler, Republicans Use Tech Antitrust Hearing To Rail
Against “Anti-Conservative Bias,” FORBES, July 29, 2020, available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2020/07/29/republicans-usetech-antitrust-hearing-to-rail-against-anti-conservativebias/?sh=cf6605155aa7; Ashley Gold and Margaret Harding McGill, New
8
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The scope of antitrust law is both broader and narrower than
the scope of statutory regulation. It is broader because it applies to all
commerce except for a few markets that have an immunity, including
express or implied federal immunities for some markets regulated by
agencies,12 or the “state action” immunity for state regulation.13
Beyond that, all commercial activities are covered by the antitrust
laws, provided that they are within federal jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause.
Antitrust is also broader in the sense that it reaches a wide
range of practices that is unspecified except with the limitation that the
conduct must either “monopolize” or “restrain trade.” The Clayton
Act added three more particularized provisions. These are §2 of the
Clayton Act, amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits
certain types of price differences; §3, which specifically applies to
exclusive dealing and tying; and §7, which applies to mergers.
Finally, however, antitrust law is also narrower in the sense that
many of the things compelled by regulation do not violate the antitrust
laws. For example, regulation might compel firms to charge particular
prices; to design products in certain ways, such as automobiles with
mandatory seat belts; to avoid discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, or political or social views; or to stop pedaling misinformation.
On their own, these practices never constitute antitrust violations.
This discussion is limited to monopolization under the antitrust
laws. It examines §2’s most problematic features concerning its
analysis of unilateral anticompetitive conduct. It is not overly
concerned with questions about market definition or how monopoly
power is assessed, although these issues are often important in the
evaluation of conduct and even more frequently relevant to selection
of an appropriate remedy. It does offer several suggestions for

Tech Antitrust Hurdle: GOP Divisions, AXIOS, June 3, 2021, available at
https://www.axios.com/tech-antitrust-hurdle-republican-party-splitsc7324063-53ba-458e-b0e2-fbf2e475a8a8.html.
12
On federal and state law antitrust immunities, see 1 & 1A PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 2 (5th ed. 2020).
13
Id, Ch. 2B-3.
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improving and unifying the antitrust law of unilateral exclusionary
practices.
While the focus is not exclusively on the large digital platforms
(Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google), these firms do pose a
number of problems. First, to the extent they operate in networked
markets the need for inter-firm cooperation is intensified. The current
antitrust law of unilateral refusal to deal in particular is not well
designed to deal with the competitive implications of widespread
multi-firm networking.14
Second, to the extent the digital platforms have high fixed costs
and deal in information, some of the tools we use to assess
exclusionary practices work poorly. This is particularly problematic
for “cost based” theories of exclusion, such as those that we apply in
the law of predatory pricing. The high fixed cost problem is not
universal however, and not even across the digital platforms. For
example, Amazon deals heavily in ordinary tactile products that have
fairly conventional cost structures. By contrast, Facebook’s content is
almost exclusively digital. A related feature of all of the platforms is
that to one degree or another they are “two-sided,” which typically
means that customer engagement and revenue come from two different
groups of transactions with different parties.15
Third, many of the injuries imposed by dominant platforms
occur in complementary or vertically related markets in which
monopoly is not seriously threatened. This poses particular problems
for §2 of the Sherman Act, which requires a realistic threat of
dominance in the particular market where the injury is claimed. For
example, Apple’s insistence that App sellers use its own store and pay
Apple’s commissions harms these sellers and consumers by denying
them the benefit of a more competitive marketplace. However, Apple
is not realistically threatening to create a monopoly in the market
currently occupied by, say, Epic Games.16 Other jurisdictions such as
the European Union whose law defines the violation as “abuse of a
14

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
On antitrust policy in two-sided markets, see Erik Hovenkamp, Platform
Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713 (2019).
16
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2021 WL 4128925
(N.D.Cal. Sep. 10, 2021), app. docketed, 9th Cir., 12-30-2021.
15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3963245

Jan. 2022

Antitrust Monopolizing

7

dominant position” either do not face this problem or else it is seriously
attenuated.17 Of all the reforms that antitrust law in the United States
might take, switching to this “abuse” standard would be the most
beneficial, provided that the concerns are managed properly. It can
also lead to harmful overuse.18
Finally, the digital marketplace has been highly productive,
with an economic growth rate about three or four times larger than that
of the economy overall.19 As a result, antitrust policy faces a problem
that has confronted it in some form since its inception: how to control
anticompetitive conduct without limiting innovation and technological
progress unnecessarily.
None of these characteristics is limited to the four dominant
digital platforms. Many other firms share some or all of them.
Antitrust policy should apply to all similar situations as best it can. For
example, eBay.com, Match.com, and Uber.com are all two sided
digital platforms that have many of the same features as the larger
platforms, to say nothing of Microsoft. If legislation is to be passed
under the antitrust laws, it should apply equally to similarly situated
firms and circumstances.
By contrast, regulation can be sector specific but then it is
usually designated as such and typically incorporates some important
distinctions, such as agency enforcement as well as lack of a private
damage or equity actions.
The Expanding Domain of §2
Section 2 is the only substantive provision of the antitrust laws
that addresses purely unilateral conduct. Section 1 requires a
“contract, combination, or conspiracy” between two or more actors.
The Robinson-Patman Act, which expanded §2 of the Clayton Act, is
triggered by a “sale,” which requires a distinct purchaser. The courts
17

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
19
See, e.g., Kevin Barefoot, et al, Defining and Measuring the Digital
Economy (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bur. Econ. Analysis (2018), available
at Working Paper: Defining and Measuring the Digital Economy (bea.gov)
(estimating GDP growth in digital economy during 2006-2016 at 5.6%,
against a general economic growth rate of 1.5%).
18
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have been clear that intra-firm transfers, such as between a parent
corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary, do not qualify as sales. 20
Section 3 of the Clayton Act prevents sales “on the condition or
understanding” of exclusive dealing or tying, which is triggered only
by an agreement among multiple firms. Finally, §7, the merger statute,
is triggered by one firm’s acquisition of the stock or assets of a
different firm.
While there is considerable overlap between the coverage of §2
and these other provisions, the overlap operates in only one direction.
That is, multilateral conduct such as a tying agreements, other
exclusionary contracts, or mergers can sometimes violate §2 of the
Sherman Act, but the converse is not the case. A purely unilateral act
cannot violate any antitrust provision other than §2.
While the explicit coverage of these other antitrust provisions
is more focused than that of §2, historically the courts have applied the
substantive law more aggressively. That is, §1 usually has lower
liability standards than §2, often reaching conduct that does not
threaten single firm monopoly. The expansive liability provisions of
the Clayton Act were passed in large part because the courts were
holding that the conduct that they addressed was not unlawful under
the Sherman Act.21 So by design, the Clayton Act is more aggressive
but reaches a narrower and more explicit range of conduct. As some
courts have noted, “proving an antitrust violation under §2 of the
Sherman Act is more exacting than proving a §1 violation.”22 The
other statutes all have less stringent market power requirements, and
traditionally they have all been regarded as requiring less at the
20

See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2311 (4th ed. 2019).
The Clayton Act was substantially a respond to Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 79 (1911), whose adoption of a rule of reason frightened
some people as a harbinger of weak enforcement; and Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) (which expressed a very tolerant attitude toward
perceived anticompetitive abuses of patents and held that a tying arrangement
was not reachable under the Sherman Act. See Paul H. LaRue, Competitive
Injury—Primary Line, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 863 (1985) (Congressional
dissatistaction with Standard Oil); Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Exhaustion
and Federalism: A Historical Note, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 29-30
(2016) (Clayton Act as response to Henry).
22
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020); Epic Games, Inc. v.
Apple, Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2021 WL 4128925 (N.D.Cal. Sep. 10, 2021).
21
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liability stage. The “restraint of trade” standard of §1 of the Sherman
Act is triggered by conduct that threatens an anticompetitive reduction
in input, whether measured by quantity, quality, or innovation. In fact,
that standard can reach conduct that falls far short of threatening actual
monopoly. In the case of per se offenses, there is no market power
requirement at all.
Both §§3 and 7 of the Clayton Act were intended by Congress
to apply more expansive standards to conduct than the Sherman Act
did; otherwise they would have been superfluous. Both are triggered
by conduct that “may substantially lessen competition,” which has
historically been interpreted to reach far less than a threat of monopoly.
Indeed, at its most expansive point the Clayton Act provisions were
interpreted to reach firms with market shares in the 4-5% range,23
although that is no longer the case.
One startling phenomenon of the twenty-first century is the
extent to which §2 of the Sherman Act has been expanding into
territory previously occupied by these other antitrust statutes. For
example, in 1998 the government brought claims under both §1 and §2
against Microsoft involving the tying of Windows and the Internet
Explorer browser.24 Although §3 of the Clayton Act covers tying, it
applies only to “goods” or “commodities,”25 very likely not covering
these digital products. The Sherman Act §1 tying claim was eventually
remanded for further analysis under the rule of reason and
subsequently abandoned.26 However, the court condemned the
“commingling” of the Windows and browser code into a single
program – a form of technological tie – under §2 of the Sherman Act.27
A few years later the government brought an exclusive dealing case
against dental services provider Dentsply, originally under §§1 & 2 of
the Sherman Act as well as §3 of the Clayton Act. After the

23

E.g., Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949)
(condemning exclusive dealing under Clayton Act on small foreclosure
shares); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966)
(condemning merger on small market shares).
24
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See Cmplt.,
¶1, available at 1998 WL 35241886 (D.D.C. May 18, 1898).
25
15 U.S.C. §14 (2018).
26
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84.
27
Id. at 66-67.
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government lost in district court it appealed only under §2 and won.28
Thus it seems that this turn to §2 was driven in substantial part by
court’s unwillingness to accept theories that relied on agreement but to
accept unilateral monopolization theories on the very same facts.
More recently, the government agencies’ complaints against
Facebook and Google involve a great deal of conduct that is given
effect by means of agreements, but virtually all of it is challenged
exclusively under the standards of §2.29 Further, the FTC’s Facebook
complaint expressly challenges two mergers – with WhatsApp and
Instagram –but does so under §2 of the Sherman Act.30
In a few situations the answer may be that the relevant conduct
is actually unilateral. For example, Microsoft’s “commingling” of the
Windows and browser code was a design choice that Microsoft made,
not a tying agreement between Microsoft and a buyer. A prominent
feature of so-called “tech ties” is that they are formally unilateral acts.
The customer is forced to take two products together, not because an
agreement requires it but rather became the products are available only
in a format that forces them to be purchased or used together.31
The other situations in which the Agencies have moved to §2
28

United States v. Dentspy Intern., Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). See the
district court’s opinion dismissing the complaint, 277 F.Supp.2d 387 (D.Del.
2003) (citing the availability of alternative dealers and relatively short
contract terms).
29
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 64, FTC v.
Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv03590-JEB (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020); Complaint ¶
45, United States v. Google LLC, No.1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 20,
2020). The FTC does not enforce the Sherman Act directly, but its power to
pursue “unfair method of competition,” 15 U.S.C. §45 (2018), covers
everything that the Sherman Act covers. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316, 321-322 (1966).
30
The now dismissed but currently appealed state AG’s complaint challenges
them under §7. See New York v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 2643724, __
F.Supp.3d ___ (D.D.C. June 28, 2021), app. docketed, (D.C. Cir. July 29,
2021) (dismissing merger portion on grounds of laches).
31
E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (camera and film compatible only
with one another); Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care
Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (new medical patient function
hospital monitor compatible only with the firm’s sensors).
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are not so easily explained. Dentsply, which involved exclusive
dealing, could only be imposed on the independent sellers who were
involved by agreement, and the conduct appears to have been
reachable under either §1 of the Sherman Act or §3 of the Clayton Act.
Mergers by definition require transactions, and thus they are always
within the domain of §1 of the Sherman Act as well as §7 of the
Clayton Act.
Some contractual restraints are conceptually more problematic.
To the extent they involve uneven bargaining power they can be
viewed as reflecting the “unilateral” policy of the larger firm. But that
has always been true in cases involving such practices as tying, where
firms announce a policy that they will not sell or lease a tying product
unless the buyer also takes a tied product. The actual sale or lease is
what causes the violation, and that is always bilateral. For that reason
both the agreement requirement of Sherman Act §1 or the parallel
“condition or understanding” requirement of Clayton §3 are met.32 In
Dentsply, the court described the record as showing “incidents in
which Dentsply required agreement by new as well as long-standing
dealers not to handle competitors' teeth.”33 The Complaints in the
Facebook and Google cases both involve numerous restrictive
agreements involving the defendant and advertisers or some other
types of suppliers.
So why the turn to §2? Two answers seem minimally plausible
but ultimately not very satisfactory. The first is that, although §2 has
more strenuous market power requirements it is less categorical about
the types of conduct that it prohibits. That is clearly true in some
situations. For example, the law of tying arrangements has
compensated for a historically weak market power requirement by
adding an overlay of technical requirements such as “separate
products” and “conditioning.”34 Design issues, as noted above, have
tended to blur the line between unilateral and multilateral conduct.
32

E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S 1 (1958) (preventual
routing contractual provisions contained in deeds); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (exclusive contract between hospital
and anesthesiologist challenged under Sherman Act as either tying or
exclusive dealing).
33
Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 190.
34
See 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
Ch. 17D (4th ed. 2018).
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The design itself is generally treated as a unilateral act. Eventually the
redesigned product has to be sold, however, which certainly involves
an agreement. Nevertheless, the courts consistently assume that §2 is
the preferred vehicle for going after allegedly anticompetitive
redesigns.35 In any event, redesigns cover only a few of the situations
involved in the turn to §2 as an enforcement vehicle.
The second reason that §2 may be preferred is that it is seen as
better calculated to yield “structural” relief. Once again, this applies
only to a subset of cases. Further, the statutory case for this argument
is non-existent. Nothing in any of the substantive or remedial
provisions of the antitrust laws even refer to structural relief. It also
fails to explain the requested relief in cases such as Dentsply, where
the government never requested a breakup to begin with, but only an
injunction.36 In Microsoft the government did request structural relief,
but the D.C. Circuit rejected the request.37 The Facebook complaint
requests divestiture of Instagram and WhatApp, but that amounts to
the undoing of mergers and that type of structural relief has always
been available and even preferred in merger cases proceeding under
§7 of the Clayton act.38 In addition the government’s Facebook
complaint requests prohibitory injunctions and other unspecified
relief, as does the Google complaint.
As a matter of statutory language, nothing in any of the
substantive antitrust statutes ties any particular violation to any
particular remedy.39 Antitrust also has enforcement provisions which
permit the government to “prevent and restrain” antitrust violations
35

E.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(divided Federal Circuit affirms §2 liability for firm that redesigned a
hypodermic biopsy gun so that it would not work with rival’s generic
needles).
36
United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2005)
(granting government’s request for injunctive relief).
37
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 100-102 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(describing but rejecting proposed plan of divestiture).
38
See FTC v. Facebook, Inc., ___ F. Supp.___, 2021 WL 2643627, *6-*7
(D.D.C. June 28, 2021) (describing request for divestiture including but not
limited to Instagram and WhatsApp, but ultimately dismissing complaint).
39
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, __ WASH. UNIV.
L.
REV.
(2021)
(in
press),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3771399.
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without distinguishing among the statutes.40 In addition, private
parties can obtain treble damages under one provision41 and
“injunctive relief” under another.42 None of these provisions stipulates
the precise nature of the relief beyond that, and none makes reference
to breaking up firms except to the extent that preventing or restraining
an antitrust violation might require the undoing of a merger.
Nevertheless, while the government’s choice to rely on §2 is
unstated, it may indicate its view that if a breakup is contemplated at
the time a complaint is filed, any breakup other than the undoing of a
merger should be based on §2 of the Sherman Act rather than §1. That
case seems very weak.
In some of these cases there are good strategic reasons for at
least including §1 of the Sherman Act in addition to §2. Here, the
Facebook complaint is a mystery. A fundamental problem with the
Facebook case is market definition – what exactly is a social
networking site, and how do you evaluate it apart from its individual
components? In its original Facebook complaint the FTC alleged a
relevant market of “personal social networking services.” The district
court dismissed that complaint, finding several problems with
determining what should be regarded as in the market, who were the
competitors, how market shares should be measured, and the extent to
which alternative measures of power might be available. The FTC
responded with an amended complaint that considerably bolstered the
relevant market allegations, but once again cited only §2 of the
Sherman Act as the source of law, not §1.43 One can readily predict a
situation in which a court fails to find a market share significant
enough to trigger §2, although it could be sufficient to invoke §1,
where lower market shares on the order of 30% or 40% are typically
found sufficient. Further, no legal rule prevents the FTC from pleading
under both statutes. The strategy must be driven as a rhetorical matter
by the FTC’s wish to make the case that this is about single-firm
dominance rather than anticompetitive agreements.

40

15 U.S.C. §25 (2018).
15 U.S.C. §15 (2018).
42
15 U.S.C. §26 (2018).
43
First Amended Compl., FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 1:20-cv03590-JEB
(D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021).
41
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Structural Prerequisites: Markets and Power
By its terms, §2 of the Sherman Act does not make it unlawful
to be a monopoly. Rather it condemns the act of “monopolizing.”
Most of the pre-antitrust case law, which consisted of challenges to
state-issued grants of exclusive rights, were directed against monopoly
status as such.44 The Patent Act cases do contain conduct challenges
that accuse the patentee of unlawfully expanding its monopoly
“beyond the scope” of the patent.45 Given the language in the statute,
the lack of good precedent, and the absence of government grants of
exclusive rights as the source of monopoly, the earliest courts
considering the monopolization offense quite naturally turned to
conduct. For example, Judge Rose’s 1916 opinion in the American
Case46 reads more like a tort case. It is a litany of the defendant’s
conduct, from anticompetitive acquisitions,47 including “killer”
acquisitions in which the acquired assets were shut down,48 exclusive
E.g., Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v.
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House co., 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
(“Slaughter-House Cases” -- upholding monopoly provision in grant of right
to slaughter animals); McRee v. Wilminton & Raleigh R.R. Co., 47 N.C. 186
(1855) (provision in toll bridge charter giving it a six mile exclusive right to
operate did not serve to prevent construction of a competing railroad); Omaha
Horse Ry. Co. v. Cable Tramway Co. of Omaha, 30 F. 324 (C.C.D.Neb.
1887) (exclusive grant to plaintiff to operate a horse drawn railroad in Omaha
to be strictly construed and thus was not violated by newly authorized cable
car railroad); City of Memphis v. Memphis Water Co., 52 Tenn. 495 (1871)
(grant of exclusive right to operate a water works did not violate state
constitutional provision forbidding “monopolies and perpetuities”).
45
See, e.g., Motion Picture patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 517 (1917) (tying of patented projector to unpatented film was attempt
to expand power “wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly”);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668 (1944)
(bundling of unpatented devices in a combination patent was an attempt to
control the supply “beyond the scope of the patentee’s monopoly”). See
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 CORN. L.
REV. 1155, 1181 (2018).
46
United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916), appeal
dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
47
Id. at 870-873.
48
Id. at 877 (noting that two-third of the acquired plants were shut down
within two years of their purchase, and many were never operated at all.
44
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contracts,49 threats of predatory pricing, and overly broad
noncompetition covenants.50 The question whether American Can was
actually a structural monopoly was addressed almost as an
afterthought, with the judge observing only that the company made
about half of the country’s cans.51 He never considered important
issues of market scope, such as whether cans competed with bottles,
which were also widely used for preserving foods.52
The cumbersome opinion in the Supreme Court’s 1911
decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States53 did no better. The Court
rehearsed a litany of bad practices, including rebates and preferences
negotiated with railroads who shipped Standard’s products, control of
pipelines, predatory price cutting, business espionage, and the
payment of rebates on oil.54 Many of these allegations, including those
of predatory pricing, have been subsequently examined and some have
been disputed.55
Gradually concerns about structural requirements became
more prominent. The opinion in United States v. United States Steel
(1920) was more concerned with market structure, refusing to
condemn the company’s formation by merger, mainly because the
defendant’s market share had declined to around 40%.56 As a result,
although the defendant may once have been a monopoly, it was no
49

Id. at 875.
Id. at 871.
51
Id. at 892.
52
Cf. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (noting
intense competition between cans and bottles and placing them within the
same relevant market).
53
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
54
Id. at 42-43.
55
See John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting; The Standard Oil (N.J.)
Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958). But see James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito,
Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of the Trial
Record, 22 Res. L. & Econ. 155 (2007) (re-examining the trial record and
finding numerous instances of predation, in conflict with McGee's
conclusions); accord Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist
History of Standard Oil, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 573 (2012). See also Ron
Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. 113–17, 144–47, 202–
25, 251–58, and passim (1998).
56
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
50
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more.57 The Court noted that vertical integration from ore to finished
product appeared to be efficient, although it did not dispute the lower
court’s conclusion that the amount was excessive.58 Then, in United
States v. International Harvester59 it refused to condemn a declining
dominant firm for alleged practices that it was no long committing, nor
for the merger of five firms into one that had been covered by a
previous (1918) consent decree.60 Decisions such as United States
Steel and International Harvester paved the way for a structural
revolution that began to take form in the 1930s.

Structuralism and the Failed Effort to Kill it
Monopolization law’s heavy reliance on conduct eventually
gave way to approaches that placed greater emphasis on market
structure, at one point coming close to making conduct irrelevant. One
important source of the shift was that competition policy was
increasingly capturing the attention of a new generation of marginalist
economists in both Europe and the United States. A variety of
economic studies during the 1910s and 1920s focused on specific
industries or specific firms, considering how their particular attributes
threatened competition.61 For example, the fixed-cost controversy,
57

Id. at 452-453.
Id. at 458-459.
59
274 U.S. 693 (1927).
60
Id. at 695.
61
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 113-114 (1989). Among the most
important were Berglund, The United States Steel Corporation and Industrial
Stabilization, 38 Q.J. ECON. 607, 608-09 (1923) (making case for
challenging consolidation in steel industry); Abraham Berglund, The United
States Steel Corporation Price Stabilization, 38 Q.J. Econ. 1, 2-7 (1923)
(criticizing United States Steel’s pricing policy as anticompetitive); Arthur
H. Cole, A Neglected Chapter in the History of Combinations: The American
Wool Manufacture, 37 Q.J. ECON. 436, 472-74 (1923) (tracing history of
wool producers’ combination); Rose R. Hess, The Paper Industry in Its
Relation to Conservation and the Tariff, 25 Q.J. ECON. 650, 656-60 (1911)
(following the growth of trusts in the paper industry from 1898-1908);
Edward S. Meade, The Price Policy of the United States Steel Corporation,
22 Q.J. ECON. 452, 465 (1908) (indicating the yearly demands and the impact
upon the growth of the steel industry through 1908); Richard Roe, The United
Shoe Machinery Company (pts. 1 & 2), 21 J. POL. ECON. 938, 938-43 (1913)
(development of the USM monopoly from 1860-1911), 22 J. POL. ECON., 43,
58
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which was a dominant feature of industrial economics prior to the midthirties, rose out of the idea that in industries with very high fixed costs
competition would not be sustainable. Firms would compete
aggressively until prices were just high enough to cover their variable
costs, but without leaving enough to pay fixed costs. This “ruinous
competition” defense has frequently been asserted in antitrust cases
and consistently rejected.62
The Harvard University economics department, the nation’s
most influential, promoted this movement heavily with its “case study”
approach that guided the research agendas of numerous graduate
students. A principal purpose of these Harvard-published industry
studies was to stress how individual markets or firms had distinct
features that required particularized analysis.63 Accelerating this trend
was renewed interest in the theory of oligopoly and a little later
43 (1914) (discussing specific business strategies at United Shoe); William
s. Stevens, The Powder Trust, 1872-1912, 26 Q.J.ECON. 444, 444-69 (1912)
(following the growth of the E.I. duPont de Nemours trust from 1872-1902).
62
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 at
308-322 (1991). E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166
U.S. 290, 368-369 (1897) (rejecting ruinous competition defense); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-222 (1940) (ruinous
competition not a defense to a price fixing conspiracy); Arizona v. Maricopa
Cty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 346 (1982) (quoting and relying of Socony
Vacuum); United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir. 2015)
(similar).
63
See, e.g., MELVIN T. COPELAND, THE COTTON MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES 154-71 (Harv. Econ. Stud. No. 8, 1912);
ARTHUR
STONE
DEWING
CORPORATE
PROMOTIONS
AND
REORGANIZATIONS 16-48 (leather industry), 49-71 (starch industry), 72-111
(glucose industry), 203-26 (salt industry), 305-411 (cotton industry), 412-63
(asphalt industry), 510-17 (glue industry), 464-509 (shipbuilding industry),
249-68 (bicycle industry) (Harv. Econ. Stud. No. 10, 1914); WILLIAM H.
PRICE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY 49-61 (mineral companies),
62-66 (impact of inventions), 67-81 (class manufacturers), 82-101
(aluminum industry), 102-06 (cloth finishing business), 107-11 (iron
industry), 112-18 (salt industry), 119-28 (soap industry) (Harv. Econ. Stud.
No. 1, 1906). Perhaps the best known study was ELIOT JONES, THE
ANTHRACITE COAL COMBINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 40-58
(combinations occurring between 1893 and 1898), 59-99 (combinations after
1898) (Harv. Econ. Stud. No. 11, 1914). Others are collected in Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Movement, supra note __at 113-114.
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Harvard Professor Edward Chamberlin’s theory of product
differentiation and monopolistic competition.64 These forced ever
closer scrutiny of relevant differences among markets or firms.
The result was an eclectic mixture of economic theories and
technical accounts emphasizing differences among industries -- not a
single model to describe competitive conditions across the economic
landscape. Head-to-head competition focusing on price and little else
appeared to occur in some markets, such as commodities. Oligopoly,
with its higher price-cost margins, was a defining characteristic of
others, depending mainly on the number of firms. Monopolistic
competition – or competition by differentiating one’s product –
became an increasingly important mechanism for describing the
performance of markets for manufactured goods where product
differentiation was possible.
In 1940 Columbia University economist John Maurice Clark
wrote what would become one of the most important pieces in the
development of antitrust economics, “Toward a Concept of Workable
Competition.”65 He developed a classification system of markets
based on structure and the degrees of product differentiation. His
categories included “Pure competition,” which required “standard”
products and pure price-determined rivalry. A second category was
“Imperfect pure competition,” which incorporated fixed costs and
scale economies and thus led to deviations from marginal cost pricing
as well as differences among various markets. Third was “Modified,
intermediate or hybrid competition,” which was characterized by
standard products but considerable differentiation in prices and other
terms of sale. Clark’s final class was markets with “unstandardized or
quality products,” which accounted for significant amounts of product
differentiation.66
This classification system differs from something that an
industrial economist might produce today, but the important
contribution was Clark’s observations parallel to those in the Harvard
64

EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1933).
65
John Maurice Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM.
ECON. REV. 241 (1940).
66
Id. at 244-245.
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School that markets seem to differ from one another in ways that
antitrust policy should find relevant. That is, the structure of a market
is important. That idea became a guiding principle of the structural
antitrust policy advocated by the Harvard School in the 1950s and
after.67 It guided the thinking of dominant figures in the 1950s
industrial organization literature who argued that industrial economics
is best focused on the study of individual markets.68 For example
Harvard trained economist Joe S. Bain’s pioneering studies of entry
barriers in the 1950s and 1960s took issue with the almost universal
assumption made by classical and early neoclassical economists that
entry by new competitors would occur any time price rose above cost.69
One important attribute of structure-focused analysis is the
view that structure determines the profitability and thus the
significance of certain types of conduct. Harvard industrial economist
Edward S. Mason, a strong proponents of structuralism in the 1930s
and 1940s, was well known for a possibly apocryphal story about a
debate he had in 1939 in which he argued that the economic
performance of the American rubber tire industry could be explained
entirely by its structure.70 As a result, conduct was simply not worth
discussing. The extreme point in this effort to classify markets on the
basis of structure was the structure-conduct-performance (SCP)

67

Most influentially in EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1957); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law
and Economics 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1937); Edward S. Mason, The Current
Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265
(1949).
68
JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959); JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS
TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTERS AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956). See Richard Schmalensee, Do
Markets Differ Much?, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 341 (1985) (offering a qualified
defense).
69
See note __, supra; and Joe S. Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration
and the Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM.
ECON. REV. 15 (1954).
70
Recounted in Joe S. Bain, Structure Versus Conduct as Indicators of
Market Performance, 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 17, 19 (1986). See
also Mason, Economic Concentration, supra note __; and Mason, Monopoly
in Law and Economics, supra.
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paradigm.71 “Performance” refers to the extent to which a market
comes close to achieving optimal competition, with low output and
higher price-cost margins indicating poor performance. Under the
most extreme version of the SCP paradigm as Mason and other
Harvard structuralists advocated, structure dictates conduct and
conduct dictates performance. As a result, conduct drops out as a
variable of interest, and we can move directly from structure to
performance.
The result for a time was a massive shift in antitrust analysis of
unilateral conduct away from business behavior and toward market
structure and the measure of firm dominance. The extreme position
was that a dominant firm monopolizes unlawfully “whenever he does
business,” as Judge Wyzanski put it in 1953.72 Judge Hand had come
close to that position in the 1945 Aluminum case, suggesting that a
monopolist monopolizes when it sells at a monopoly price, and that
such conduct was inherent in the definition of a monopolist.73 It also
led to very influential work by Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner
arguing that oligopoly and poor performance are virtrually inherent in
structurally concentrated industries. As a result, antitrust policy
should seek to have these industries broken up.74
Structuralism ultimately led to a protracted argument over “no
fault” monopolization, or the idea that certain monopolies should be
broken up by the antitrust laws without any finding of anticompetitive
conduct. That idea captured even the first edition of the generally
centrist Antitrust Law treatise. Areeda and Turner, its authors, would
have limited the breakup power to suits by the government, and then

71

For a brief history, see Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition
Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 350-353 (2009). On its
demise, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the
Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 219, 219-22 (2009).
72
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D.
Mass. 1953).
73
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F2d 416, 427-428 (2d Cir.
1945).
74
CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANAYSIS (1959); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
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only if the monopoly had persisted for at least five years.75 No
provision for no fault monopolization was ever enacted,76 and today it
is clear that §2’s monopolization offense requires a showing of both
substantial market power and anticompetitive conduct.
This structuralist view became a principal target of the Chicago
School, whose proponents argued that markets really do not differ all
that much at all, and perfect competition models provide the best
explanation for all of them.77 Stigler in particular, aided later by Milton
Friedman,78 championed the view that perfect competition, collusion,
and monopoly described all of the relevant states of the economic
world and that in the vast majority of cases the problem of entry
barriers is no more important than the classical economists had
assumed.79
This Chicago-dominated reversion to perfect competition
models had a robust life in industrial economics prior to the mid1980s, and considerable success in some American law schools after
that. In the main, however, it faltered under an empirical revolution in
industrial economists that has served to restore theories of oligopoly
and imperfect competition to dominance at least as strong as it was in
the 1940s and 1950s.80 In antitrust, the Chicago School succeeded
75

3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶618-623
(1978). I have preserved this section from the original edition largely intact,
although with some brief commentary. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶630-638 (5th ed. 2022) (in
press).
76
On some of the efforts, see William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for
Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989).
77
Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696
(1986); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127
UNIV. PA. L. REV. 925, 931 (1979) (criticizing structuralism as “…derived
from observation, unsystematic and often superficial, of business behavior”)
78
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs, __ UNIV. PA. J. L. & BUS.
(2022)
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3853282.
79
See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968);
Hovenkamp, Error Costs, supra note __.
80
E.g., Timothy Bresnahan and Richard Schmalensee, The Empirical
Renaissance in Industrial Economics, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 371 (1987).
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mainly in taking the edge off several fantastic and unjustified theories
that had migrated into antitrust policy, particularly in the 1950s and
1960s.81 Its more pointed contributions faltered. For example, George
Stigler’s theory of entry barriers, which would have narrowed
considerably the scope of perceived barriers to entry, was never widely
adopted by antitrust policy makers or tribunals.82 Harold Demsetz’
influential view that bidding for natural monopoly markets could
displace regulation never took hold as a substitute for regulation,
although it did make policy makers more aware of the possibilities of
potential competition.83 The Chicago School view that vertical
restraints such as resale price maintenance could be fully explained by
free rider concerns ended up describing only a small subset of the
total.84 Bork’s view that only mergers to near monopoly should be
challenged85 never took hold, and even the merger guidelines at their
most neoliberal point permitted pursuit of mergers that created postmerger market shares of around 30%.86
The two government antitrust policy documents that came
closest to expressing Chicago School neoliberal views were the 1982
Merger Guidelines, and the controversial 2007 statement on
monopolistic practices, which the FTC had refused to sign and was
withdrawn only two years later. The merger guidelines issued in 1982
spoke of the problem of horizontal mergers as concerned with
“monopolists and groups of colluding firms.”87 They acknowledged no
theory of oligopoly other than recognition that in markets with a small
81

Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott-Morton, Framing the Chicago School
of Antitrust Analysis, 168 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1843 (2020).
82
See Hovenkamp, Error Costs, supra note __.
83
Id., discussing Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON.
55 (1968).
84
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §11.3 (6th ed. 2020) (discussing Lester G.
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86
(1960).
85
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 198-221 (1978).
86
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
87
E.g. United States Dept. of Justice, 1982 Merger Guidelines, § IV, 1.1
(1982), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-mergerguidelines. This set of Guidelines was issued by the Justice Department
alone, without the co-sponsorship of the FTC.
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number of firms they might be able to “coordinate, explicitly or
implicitly, their actions in order to approximate the performance of a
monopolist.”88 While that did acknowledge that the coordination
might be “implicit” rather than by express agreement, it also indicated
that the result would be to approximate the performance of a
monopolist. That is, there was no recognition of oligopoly strategies
in which firms attain equilibria at price levels below the monopoly
level and varying with the number of firms in the market. As in the
Stigler model, this theory of oligopoly was really nothing more than
collusion by another name.89
Further, in the 1982 Guidelines product differentiation was
regarded as a mitigating factor that served mainly to undermine
attempts at collusion.
Price fixing is relatively simple in
undifferentiated markets, the Guidelines asserted, because the “cartel
need establish only a single price.”90 By contrast, under differentiation
the cartel may have to come with a more “complex schedule of prices
corresponding to gradations in actual or perceived quality
attributes.…”91 As a result, the 1982 Guidelines concluded, “ when
the relevant product is very heterogeneous or sold subject to complex
configuration options or customized production, the Department is less
likely to challenge the merger.”92 By contrast, the 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, which were issued jointly by the Justice
Department and the FTC, abandoned the practice of treating product
differentiation as a mitigating factor. Further, they initially raised the
idea that has now become prominent in merger analysis that under
product differentiation a firm might be able to use a merger to
“unilaterally” raise its price above pre-merger levels, depending on the
relative closeness of the merging firms’ products to one another.93
Unilateral effects theory has effectively turned product differentiation
into an aggravating factor in those markets where it applies.
The section 2 Report was published in 2007 under the title
“Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2
88

Id. § I.
See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs, supra note __.
90
1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note __, III. C. 1.1.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
93
Id. at 2.211.
89
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of the Sherman Act.”94 It was much more concerned with errors of
over-enforcement than with actually identifying exclusionary
practices.95 The exceedingly short life of the Section 2 Statement
indicates that by the time it was produced its ideas had lost most of
their support outside of purely political circles.
Notwithstanding the Chicago School, market structure has
remained as an essential component in the analysis of monopoly under
the antitrust laws. For example, a unilateral refusal to deal with a
competitor would never be an antitrust violation in a competitive
market, but it might be in a market with a dominant firm. The
lawfulness of exclusionary pricing practices depends heavily on the
structure of the market in which the conduct occurs. In addition,
analysis of mergers has retained its structural focus right up to the
present day.96 Even the 1982 Guidelines never reached the extreme
Chicago School prohibitions. For example, they would have
authorized the challenge of a merger creating a 30% firm – far, far
short of Bork’s recommendations articulated only four years earlier.97
Today it is clear that the monopolization offense consists of
two interdependent parts, each of which must be established.98 First,
the structural component requires proof of a market that is sufficiently
prone to monopolization. This is a question of the number of firms in
a well-defined market subject to entry barriers, but particularly the
relative size (market share) of the largest firm, and the comparative
size of others. Secondly, however, anticompetitive conduct is
Available in the Justice Department’s digital archieves.
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firmconduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-1.
95
Id, Part G.
96
Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, market
Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018).
97
Under the 1982 Guidelines the government would be “likely to challenge”
a merger if the post-merger HHI exceeded 1800 and the increase brought
about by the merger exceeded 100 points. To illustrate, assume a pre-merger
market of six firms with shares of 25, 20, 20, 20, 10, and 5. Suppose that the
25% firm merged with the 5% firm. The post-merger HHI would be 2200
and the increase brought about by the merger would be 250, well above the
threshold for “likely” challenge.
98
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __,
§§6.1 – 6.3.
94
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essential. Third, the two elements of the monopolization defense are
interdependent in that certain types of conduct acquire greater or lesser
significance depending on a defendant’s degree of dominance and the
extent to which the market is conducive to durable monopoly.

Market Structure and Attempts
The monopolization offense implies two separate structural
requirements. First, the market in question must be one that is capable
of being monopolized. Second, the firm whose conduct is being
examined must hold sufficient market power to be convicted of the
offense. Further §2 of the Sherman Act recognizes two distinct
offenses, monopolization and attempt.99 Nothing in the statute
distinguishes the two offenses substantively, but in 1905 Justice
Holmes offered a formula that has proven to be durable. Under that
formulation, which comes from the common law of attempted crimes,
an attempt requires 1) specific intent to create a monopoly; 2) at least
one instance of anticompetitive conduct; and 3) a “dangerous
probability” that the conduct, if permitted to run its course, would
succeed.100
Beginning with the sensible premise that the result of an
attempt must be something less than the completed offense, the court
have sometimes lost sight of what “attempt” really means as an
actionable offense. It should not turn business torts into
monopolization offenses. Rather, as with common law attempts
generally, there must be a realistic likelihood of success, even though
the conduct in the particular case either failed or was intercepted before
it had completed its mission.

15 U.S.C. §2 (2018) (“who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize…”). That statute also recognizes a third offense of conspiracy
to monopolize, but it has been rendered largely irrelevant to the extent that
anything that could be a conspiracy to monopolize would also be a
conspiracy to restrain trade under the more aggressive case law governing §1
of the Sherman Act.
100
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). Holmes explicitly
found the source of his formulation in the common law, citing one of his own
earlier decisions from when he was Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. Com. V. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267 (1901) (attempted
arson).
99
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Noteworthy here is the fact that both monopolization and the
attempt offense have the same remedy when the plaintiff is a
competitor. For consumers the remedies differ to the extent that an
unsuccessful attempt to create a monopoly will not result in a
monopoly overcharge, and thus there will not be purchaser actions
based on monopoly prices. For competitors injured by some form of
market exclusion, however, it makes no difference whether the
conduct has been labeled unlawful monopolization or unlawful
attempt: the private plaintiff can recover all damages, trebled, that are
attributable to the antitrust violation. For example, if predatory pricing
is found to have ruined the plaintiff’s competing business the damages
will be the same whether or not the predation succeeded in creating a
monopoly. Success takes the form of recoupment, which injures
consumers but actually benefits surviving competitors.
One good example of overreaching under the law of attempt is
Tops Markets, Inc. vs. Quality Markets, Inc.,101 where the defendant
was accused of monopolization in the market for retail grocery sites
by buying up suitable sites in the geographic area. The court dismissed
the monopolization claim after observing that defendant Quality did
not have the power because new entrants could “readily enter the …
market at any number of available sites and compete successfully for
supermarket sales.”102 Then, however, the court went on to sustain a
claim of attempt to monopolize, based on the purchase of a site that
the plaintiff was negotiating to buy. The court explained that “a lesser
degree of market power may establish an attempted monopolization
claim” than a claim for completed monopolization.103 In this case the
plaintiff’s injury was caused by the fact that the defendant bought a
parcel of land out from under the plaintiff, who was planning to build
101

142 F.23d 90 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 99. The court elaborated:
On this record we can draw no reasonable inference other than that
Quality lacks monopoly power. Despite its high market share, no
other evidence—such as barriers to entry, the elasticity of demand,
or the nature of defendant's conduct—supports the conclusion that
Quality can control prices or exclude competition and in fact,
Wegmans' quick garnishment of such high market share
dispositively refutes such a conclusion.
Ibid.
103
Id. at 100.
102
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a store there in competition with the defendant. There certainly may
have been a breach of contract or perhaps tortious interference, but
given the court’s observations about new entry monopoly was never
in the cards. However, the plaintiff’s damages would be based on the
lost business opportunity contemplated by the sale, and that would not
depend on whether the antitrust offense was monopolization or
attempt.
The logical disconnect in the Tops case was that in dismissing
the complaint the court had already concluded that the market in
question was not capable of being monopolized. If the conduct could
not possibly have succeeded in creating a monopoly, then the attempt
offense could not occur either. The Tops story is the equivalent of the
person who points a banana at someone and says “bang, you’re dead.”
That conduct could not possibly be a murder, but it could not be an
attempt either, no matter what the defendant’s state of mind.
The grandparent of the Second Circuit’s approach was the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co,104 which had
held that that the attempt to monopolize offense could be satisfied by
a showing of either specific intent to create a monopoly, or a dangerous
probability that the conduct, if permitted to run its course, would have
done so. Tidewater Oil Company, which owned several gasoline
stations, was not a dominant firm and the conduct being challenged
was exclusive dealing, or a requirement that its leased gasoline station
operators purchase all of their gasoline needs from itself,105 somewhat
looser allegations of resale price maintenance,106 and a tying
requirement that the stations purchase their tires, batteries, and
automotive accessories from Tidewater.107 While there was no
realistic probability that a firm of Tidewater’s size could use any of
these practices to monopolize a market, the court held that such a
showing was unnecessary. Rather, “specific intent itself is the only
evidence of dangerous probability that the statute requires.”108

104

327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964).
Id at 467.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Id. at 474.
105
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The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan109 overruled the Lessig line of cases, turning the
focus back to the “dangerous probability” requirement itself and
requiring proof of a relevant market to establish a “realistic probability
that the defendants could achieve monopoly power in that market.”110
The Spectrum holding is quite defensible for conduct occurring
within a single market, as was true in that case. It does leave behind
one distressing situation, however, and that is when a monopolist
whose position is clearly established by the criteria that the Spectrum
decision approves uses that position to injure rivals in a related market.
The Case for Abuse of Dominance – Multiple Markets and Networks
One common feature of dominant digital platforms is that a
firm may have significant power in its overall platform, but not in the
individual segments in which it operates. Amazon is a prominent
example. While it dominates as a platform, it nevertheless has only
modest positions in most of the individual products that it sells, save
eBooks. Facebook is also a dominant social networking site, but not
in the individual markets for posted videos, photos, messaging, and the
like. Google may be a dominant network. It also has a dominant
position in general consumer search,111 and a substantial position in its
office suite of product, but not in email client Gmail, Waymo, or many
of the other products that it sells. Whatever dominance Apple may
enjoy for the iPhone does not extend to the markets for most of the
individual apps that it sells on the iPhone platform. To what extent
should these firms be held accountable for competitive injuries in these
individual markets even when there is not a realistic prospect of
monopoly in them?

109

506 U.S. 447 (1993)
Id. at 459.
111
See https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-shareof-search-engines/ (showing Google Search with an 85% market share as of
September, 2021).
110
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Relatedly, should it matter whether the injury results from
“exclusion” of a rival product or “extraction” of higher returns? To
monopolize, as most courts interpret it, means to exclude actual or
potential rivals.112 By contrast, an abuse of a dominant position can
be something that results in higher prices. When properly interpreted,
both harm consumers.
This subsection briefly makes a case for modifying §2 of the
Sherman Act to include abuse of dominance as an offense, but with
some limitations.

Abuse of Dominance Under U.S. Law
In United States v. Griffith113 the defendant owned a chain of
movie theaters in several towns in Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico.
In some towns it held a dominant position while other towns were
more competitive. Griffith acquired its position by building modern
well-equipped theaters, in contrast to the converted storerooms that
were often used by individual operators.114 The industry practice for
multi-theatre chains was that one agent for the company would travel
to New York to negotiate exhibition contracts for the entire chain. 115
That practice alone seems unexceptional and quite efficient. The
problem is that Griffith’s group of theaters was large, and included
both the monopoly towns where Griffith dominated, as well as the
competitive towns. By negotiating for all of the towns together,
Griffith was able to obtain more favorable terms than its smaller rivals
who operated only in the competitive towns.
The assumption of the government’s antitrust challenge was
that monopoly was not threatened in the competitive towns, but that
the defendant obtained a competitive advantage in them because it was
112

On the definition of monopolizing conduct, see 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶651 (5th ed. 2022) (in press).
113
334 U.S. 100 (1948).
114
The district court’s opinion recounts the facts. United States v. Griffith
Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp. 180, 182 (W. D. Ok. 1946).
115
334 U.S. at 186.
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able to consolidate its bargaining over all of the towns in which it
operated theaters. No attempt was made to distinguish undesirable
leveraging in the sense of “forcing” the licensors to accept lower prices
in the competitive towns because of the defendant’s market power,
from the simple fact that economies of scale could inhere in bargaining
over a larger group of theaters at a time. Indeed, the complaint focused
almost entirely on the injury suffered by competitors who were unable
to obtain the same terms that the defendant did.116
Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court concluded that it is “not
always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade or to build a
monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated.”
Rather, [i]t is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results as
the consequence of a defendant's conduct or business
arrangements.”117 Then, he concluded, “the use of monopoly power,
however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful.”118
The most controversial part of Justice Douglas’ statement was
its conclusion that the use of monopoly power to gain a “competitive
advantage” is an act of unlawful monopolization. Dicta in the Second
Circuit’s Berkey Photo decision thirty years later put a finer point on
it:
[T]he use of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a
competitive advantage in another is a violation of §2, even if
there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second market.
It is the use of economic power that creates the liability.119
116

Id. at 103-104.
Id. at 105.
118
Id. at 107. The harm that Justice Douglas identified was that
The consequence of such a use of monopoly power is that films are
licensed on a non-competitive basis in what would otherwise be
competitive situations. That is the effect whether one exhibitor
makes the bargain with the distributor or whether two or more
exhibitors lump together their buying power, as appellees did here.
It is in either case a misuse of monopoly power under the Sherman
Act.
Id. at 108.
119
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (emphasis added).
117
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Stated this way the monopoly leveraging theory pushes the law of §2
beyond acts of “monopolization,” or attempting to create or preserve a
monopoly. The harm is the use of a monopoly position to harm a rival,
even if monopoly in the rival’s market is not in prospect. The theory
applies to defendants who operate in multiple markets, which can refer
either to those serving different geographic or product markets, or else
firms that are vertically integrated and serve both an upstream and a
downstream market.120 More importantly, it can also apply to
networks, which involve not only the aggregation of multiple markets
but also a high degree of interdependence among them.
In 1993 the Supreme Court appeared to rule out claims of
nonmonopolistic leveraging. Section 2 “makes the conduct of a single
firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously
threatens to do so.”121 The Court continued, that those concerns were
“not met by inquiring only whether the defendant has engaged in
“unfair” or “predatory” tactics.122 While that statement seems very
strong, not all of the lower courts interpreted it that way.123 In any
event, in a footnote in its Trinko decision the Supreme Court clearly
laid the Griffith doctrine to rest. Speaking of the lower court’s opinion
it said:
The Court of Appeals also thought that respondent's complaint
might state a claim under a “monopoly leveraging” theory (a
theory barely discussed by respondent…). We disagree. To the
extent the Court of Appeals dispensed with a requirement that
there be a “dangerous probability of success” in monopolizing
a second market, it erred.124
120

For example, the Court relied on leveraging theory to condemn vertical
integration in the motion picture industry. United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 173-175 (1948) (“Likewise bearing on the question
whether monopoly power is created by the vertical integration, is … the
leverage on the market which the particular vertical integration creates or
makes possible.”).
121
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 448 (1993).
122
Ibid.
123
E.g. Zschaler v. Claneil Enters., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 929 (D. Vt. 1997)
(accepting monopoly leveraging theory for summary judgment purposes;
noting Second Circuit law).
124
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 415 n. 4 (2004) (emphasis added).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3963245

Jan. 2022

Antitrust Monopolizing

32

This issue and its resolution could prove decisive in antitrust
litigation against large digital platforms, all of whom operate in
multiple markets. Many of the harms discussed in the Griffith line of
cases involve conduct that threatens harm to rivals or perhaps higher
prices, but they do not realistically threaten to create a monopoly in the
rival’s market. For example, Amazon neither has nor realistically
threatens to have a monopoly in most of the products that it sells, with
the exception of ebooks, and even there control by the publishers
makes monopoly unlikely. Epic Games was a monopolization case,
but the court declined to find Apple liable, mainly on market power
grounds.125 Once again, however, Epic competed in a downstream
market – electronic games – where Apple did not even have a position
and is unlikely to threaten dominance. Nevertheless, Apple’s practice
of requiring makers of games or other apps to sell exclusively only
through its own store and requiring payment of a high commission
very likely did result in higher prices.126
These are fundamentally problems in vertical integration.
While the secondary markets are more competitive, rivals also require
access to a marketplace on which they can sell their products.127
Whether the platform is a monopolist in the platform itself is a question
of fact. In any event, in many situations there is no realistic threat of
monopoly in the secondary market.
Claims of linking dominant markets with nondominant
secondary products are common when the challenged practice is
covered by an agreement. This is common in the law of tying
arrangements,128 although it is also relevant to vertical mergers. 129
What those two practices have in common is that the owner of the
125

Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., __ F.Supp.3d __, 2021 WL 4128925
(N.D.Cal. Sep. 10, 2021).
126
At this writing the EU is pursuing the claim, and the Dutch antitrust
authority has concluded that Apple’s policy constitutes an abuse of a
dominant position with respect to dating sites. See
https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-obliges-apple-adjustunreasonable-conditions-its-app-store.
127
Erik Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Duty to Deal in the Age of Big Tech, __
YALE
L.J.
(2022)
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3889774.
128
See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, Ch. 10.
129
Id., §9.4.
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dominant marketplace forces people to take its own secondary product.
In fact, the law of unlawful tying requires “conditioning,” or coercion,
in the sense that buyers are forced to take the second product as a
condition of obtaining the first.130 By the same token, the law of
vertical mergers usually presumes that the vertically related firm will
deal exclusively in the vertically related product.131
The easier cases are when a contractual constraint “ties” the
platform and the secondary product together. That does not cover the
situation where the platform merely offers the secondary product,
making no real effort to force sales through its own platform. For
example, Amazon sells Duracell batteries together with batteries made
by other manufacturers and its own AmazonBasics brand. However,
a customer is free to purchase Duracell batteries from numerous
competing outlets, both online and traditional, and no one is required
to purchase AmazonBasics as an alternative to a name brand battery.
The “forcing” must come from some other source – perhaps a lower
price for the AmazonBasics alternative, or perhaps more favorable
display on Amazon’s website. If unilateral, neither of these practices
violates United States antitrust law. By contrast, the “forcing” claim
with respect to Apple’s Appstore, as in the Epic Games decision,132
has more traction: one who wants to purchase a game for an iPhone is
effectively forced to use the Appstore for the purchase.
The European Union’s position on non-monopolistic effects in
secondary markets is more aggressive than the U.S. position. Article
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits
an “abuse … of a dominant position”133 within a member state or “as
it may affect trade between member states.” That language imposes a
broader conduct standard than does §2 of the Sherman Act and may
reach situations where a firm is dominant in one market but is found
to have abused its power in a second market but without threatening

130

On the conditioning requirement in tying law, see 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1752 (4th ed. 2019).
131
See 4A Id. at ¶¶1003-1004.
132
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2021 WL 4128925
(N.D.Cal. Sep. 10, 2021), app. docketed, 9th Cir., 12-30-2021.
133
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 102, cl. 1, Mar. 30,
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47.
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monopoly.134 This can be decisive in digital platform markets when a
firm has a degree of dominance there but then refuses to deal,
discriminates against, or otherwise disfavors sellers in a secondary
market. While there is not a realistic threat of monopoly in the
secondary market, prices may be higher.135 Notably, however, even
the EU’s approach would not permit pursuing a dominant firm simply
because it sold in a more competitive secondary market. The language
requires an “abuse” of a dominant position. Defining “abuse” is the
hard part.
Fidelity to the text very likely would not permit “abuse of a
dominant position” to be read into §2 of the Sherman Act – although,
as noted above, there is clear although now overruled Supreme Court
precedent for it.136 Unless monopoly either exists in the secondary
market or there is a dangerous probability that it will exist, the conduct
appears not to fall within the literal language of §2.
Why Abuse of Dominance?
The abuse of dominance standard is in many ways better suited
to networks and other information technology markets than is the
monopolization standard – provided that the “abuse” requirement is
taken seriously. The underlying premise that drives §2 analysis in
cases involving practices such as refusal to deal is that each firm must
stand on its own bottom. While the Supreme Court’s Trinko decision
declining to expand refusal to deal law arose in a networked industry,
in fact its network analysis was thin to non-existent. Rather, it was
134

See James Keyte, Why the Atlantic Divide on Monopoly/Dominance Law
is so Difficult to Bridge, 33 ANTITRUST 113, 117 (Fall, 2018) in the EU,
“leveraging has settled in as a standard theory of exclusion and harm”); and
see, e.g., Sealink, Commission Decision (94/19/EEC), Dec. 21, 1993, 1994
O.J. (L 15); and Google and Alphabet v. Commission (“Google Shopping”),
General Court of the European Union , 10 Nov. 2021 (press release). For the
full text of the Commission’s decision, see CASE AT.39740, Google Search
(Shopping), 39740_14996_3.pdf (europa.eu).
Paul Lugard & Lee Roach, The Era of “Big Data” and EU/U.S.
Divergence for Refusals to Deal, 31 ANTITRUST 58 (Spg. 2017).
136
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
135
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quite correctly driven by the fact that in this case a regulatory agency
had already been given that obligation in the 1996
Telecommunications Act, and it had actually already disciplined the
defendant for violating its interconnection obligations.137 The most
relevant holding in Trinko is that the antitrust laws should not be used
to graft a private remedy in favor of a plaintiff, including treble
damages, upon a regulatory statute that did not include its own private
action provision.
Networks have higher expectations about interfirm
cooperation. Indeed, the alternative to networks completely controlled
by a single firm is networks that require collaboration among
competitors, sometimes quite extensive. One of the more troubling
threats to competition within networks is dominant firms. In general,
nonominant firms in network industries have a strong incentive to
participate in the network. By contrast, dominant firms have an
incentive to keep control to themselves so that they do not have to
share any revenue.138 This is basically the Qualcomm story, in which
Qualcomm made FRAND obligations to participate in the network by
making its patents available to all participants on a fair, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory basis. Once it had acquired a dominant position
in a particular technology, however, it refused to honor those
obligations in order to limit competition for sales to Apple, a large
purchaser of the types of chips that Qualcomm was making. For that
reason, the Ninth Circuit’s decision against the FTC was an important
opportunity lost.139 The facts of Qualcomm clearly established both
market exclusion and competitive harm, including higher prices.140
Amending §2 to cover abuses of dominant positions is a
superior alternative to the various proposals pending before Congress
to legislate sharing or abuse standards.141 First, the proposed
Verizon Comm’s, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 413 (2004) (noting that FCC had imposed a “substantial fine’ and begun
monitoring Verizon’s interconnection practices).
138
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition,
and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 425 (1985).
139
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
140
For analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 1683, 1685-1688 (2020).
141
See John D. McKinnon, Effort to Bar Tech Companies From “SelfPreferencing” Gains Transaction, Wall St. J. (Oct. 15, 2021), available at
137
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provisions are too narrow in that they apply to the major digital
platforms but leave out many other firms who could be engaged in the
same conduct. Second, they can impose seriously counterproductive
outcomes, particularly when nothing realistically constituting
anticompetitive abuse is present. Depending on the text that emerges,
which is unknown at this writing, this could effectively become a
species of public utility regulation or, worse yet, special interest
legislation favoring small business over consumers, labor and others
who benefit from more competitive markets.
Abuses of the “Abuse” Standard
“Abuse of dominance” language would give courts a chance to
develop legal rules that are better designed to control nonmonopolistic
but anticompetitive abuses by dominant plaforms. They could
increase competition in some market situations, particularly network
industries that require competitor collaboration over multiple products
or that involve dominant distribution platforms.
The danger of an overly aggressive abuse of dominance
standard is that it can limit harmless and even beneficial behavior.
That is, “abuse” must be properly limited to competitive harm, and
antitrust should not incorporate the law of business torts by giving it
another name.142 For example, Amazon is not “abusing” a dominant
position if it selects two or three among dozens of rivals’ products for
inclusion on its website, even as it excludes others. For example, if
Amazon decides to sell its own kitchen cutting board must it also carry
the cutting boards of the other 181 firms that sell cutting boards?143
Nor is it an abuse for it to sell its own products, such as AmazonBasics
AAA batteries, at a lower price than rivals such as Duracell or
Eveready are offering. And it should not be an abuse for a firm to take
advantage of efficiencies that occur when its offers products in
combination, or at a lower price when combined with others.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/effort-to-bar-tech-companies-from-selfpreferencing-gains-traction-11634202000
142
See discussion infra text at notes __.
143
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Congress’ Antitrust War on China and
American Consumers (Promarket, June 25, 2021), at
https://promarket.org/2021/06/25/congress-antitrust-china-consumersmerger/.
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Other situations where an abuse standard could improve
competition are where the abuse of a dominant position consists in
extraction rather than exclusion. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlike
§1, is triggered by “exclusionary” conduct, not merely by conduct that
results in higher prices. A good illustration of the difference is the
Rambus litigation. The D.C. Circuit rejected the Federal Trade
Commission’s claim that Rambus violated §2 by participating in
standard setting organizations while surreptitiously developing patents
to cover the very technology for which it was approving standards.144
After the standard was adopted, it sprang these patents on the firms
that had implemented it.145 Even though this conduct may have
resulted in higher prices, the appellate court held, it was merely
deceptive, not exclusionary.146 “But an otherwise lawful monopolist's
use of deception simply to obtain higher prices normally has no
particular tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish
competition.”147 The “abuse” standard would have seen the issue
differently – not whether the conduct threatened additional monopoly
but rather whether it threatened competitive harm at all, and in this
case it clearly did.
New York legislation that appears close to passage at this
writing148 creates serious risks of these problems. New York’s current
antitrust law, the Donnelley Act, does not contain a monopolization
provision at all.149 As a result the state may be overdue for legislation
against unilateral conduct by dominant firms. The proposed bill
incorporates both language that emulates §2 of the Sherman Act and
an abuse of dominance provision.150 It also creates a presumption that
144

Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D. C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 460-461.
146
Id. at 464.
147
Id. at 465.
148
Twenty-First Century Antitrust Act (S.-8700-A), reported at
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2021/s933#:~:text=(A)%20IT%2
0SHALL%20BE%20UNLAWFUL,A%20DOMINANT%20POSITION%2
0IN%20THE (Jan. 6, 2021).
149
N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. §340 (1999).
150
S-8700-A (amending §340 by adding, in part):
2. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to monopolize
or monopsonize, or attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons to
145
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a market seller’s share of 40% is a dominant position,151 as well as
permitting market power to be addressed by direct evidence.152 It then
defines abuse of dominance as including, but not limited to:
conduct that tends to foreclose or limit the ability or incentive
of one or more actual or potential competitors to compete, such
as leveraging a dominant position in one market to limit
competition in a separate market, or refusing to deal with
another person with the effect of unnecessarily excluding or
handicapping actual or potential competitors. In labor markets,
abuse may include, but is not limited to, imposing contracts
by which any person is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind, or restricting the
freedom of workers and independent contractors to disclose
wage and benefit information.
Finally, the bill provides that “evidence of pro-competitive
effects shall not be a defense to abuse of dominance and shall not
offset or cure competitive harm.”
Much depends, of course, on what the courts end up doing with
this legislation, and the New York Attorney General is authorized to
issue guidelines for its enforcement.153 Nevertheless, the current
language re-creates most of the risks that illustrate what went wrong
with monopoly leveraging theory under the Sherman Act. The explicit
rejection of evidence of procompetitive effects raises the possibility
that this statute cold force serious economic harm onto the New York
economy as well as other states that could be affected. The proposed
monopolize or monopsonize any business, trade or commerce or
the furnishing of any service in this state.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person or persons with a
dominant position in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce, in any labor market, or in the furnishing of any service
in this state to abuse that dominant position.
151
The statute lowers the threshold to 30% for buyers.
152
Id., §§(b) (1), (2)
153
Id., §(c)(iii).
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legislation is seriously concerned about employer restraints in labor
markets, but oblivious of the harm to labor caused by reduced
productivity and output, and that harm could be far larger.
The series of older American antitrust decisions that have
accepted non-monopolistic abuse as a theory of harm were often
excessive because they equated “abuse” with almost any kind of harm
to a competitor. Griffith itself is an example. Using a single buying or
selling agent to represent a firm’s multiple outlets is hardly a
suspicious or undesirable practice. It saves distribution costs for the
same reason that any activity subject to economies of scale may be
beneficial as a firm produces more. In the process, it may also harm
smaller rivals who are dealing in smaller quantities or fewer markets.
The problem with the Griffith decision is that it did not explore these
alternatives, but just assumed that a negotiator who bargained for a
number of outlets was obtaining an anticompetitive advantage over
single-theater firms who could not match that scale. Inadequately
restrained, an overly aggressive rule can serve to condemn
competitively beneficial practices.
The “leveraging” statement in Berkey Photo presents a similar
threat, although in that case the court declined to condemn the conduct.
After stating its acceptance of a leverage theory that court explained
that an “integrated business” does not violate the Sherman Act merely
because one department “benefits from association with a division
possessing a monopoly in its own market.”154 That court explained:
So long as we allow a firm to compete in several fields, we
must expect it to seek the competitive advantages of its broadbased activity, more efficient production, greater ability to
develop complementary products, reduced transaction costs,
and so forth. These are gains that accrue to any integrated firm,
regardless of its market share, and they cannot by themselves
be considered uses of monopoly power.
The principal Berkey Photo leveraging claim had been made in
154

Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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reference to Kodak’s introduction of a new camera/film format that
displaced its previous Brownie line of cameras but that also made
operations more costly for the independent but competitively
structured photofinishing market. In order to develop the new film,
photofinishers required more specialized equipment, but the evidence
suggested that rivals could obtain this. As a result, there was never
any serious probability that Kodak’s new film format was going to
create a monopoly in photofinishing. At best, it made life more
difficult for independent photofinishers.155
Kodak’s introduction of its new camera was a clear technical
advance that consumers embraced, in no small part because it
employed a film cartridge that was easier to use and more resistant to
user error. But the technological advance in question occurred because
it involved interrelated developments in two markets for complements
– cameras and film – both of which Kodak dominated. Berkey, which
made cameras and provided film developing services
(”photofinishing”),156 claimed that processing film for the new
Instamatic required proprietary information about the film developing
process as well as some specialized equipment.157 It theory of harm
was that Kodak provided this information in advance to photofinishers
that it owned, namely Kodak’s own “Color Print and Processing”
division (CP&P), but not to independent photofinishers such as
Berkey. As a result, Berkey had to play catch-up in the photofinishing
market until it got its own equipment and technical knowledge up to
speed.
That claim directly countered Kodak’s objection, supported by
the Court of Appeals, that a dominant firm innovating a new product
or process has no duty to predisclose it to rivals beyond the disclosure
requirements contained in the patent laws.158 Berkey’s claim would
have placed antitrust law in a head on collision with patent law, which
requires a form of disclosure that must be placed in the patent
application.159 Further, trade secret law provides protection only for
protected nondisclosure. In any event, quite aside from the concern
155

Id at 291-292.
602 F.2d at 267.
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The facts are recounted at 457 F.Supp. 404, 417-420 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Berkey, 603 F.2d at 281.
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whether predisclosure might benefit a smaller competitor – we can
assume that it would – it is hardly clear that it would further either
competition or innovation in the longer run.
In situations involving distribution, which is what Griffith
involved, harm to the competitor can be fully explained by economies
of scale or scope or also transaction cost savings. As a result,
nonmonopoly explanations are typically present. Even a multistore
operator with a small market share may be able to obtain a lower price
or better terms by negotiating for the business of numerous stores at
once. In that case the competitive advantage has nothing to do with
dominance but only with transactional economies or economies of
scale.
By contrast the litigation in Alaska Airlines, Inc v. United
Airlines, Inc.,160 stated a more promising abuse of dominance claim. It
also occurred on a network. The defendant controlled a computerized
airline reservation system (CRS) and licensed other airlines to use it
for scheduling but discriminated against smaller airlines such as the
plaintiffs. The defendant, a dominant legacy carrier, appeared to be
using control of the reservation system to discriminate against smaller
carriers. In this case, if the CRS had been jointly operated as a
competitive network the refusal to share would have been reachable
under §1 of the Sherman Act as concerted action – much like the claim
in the Terminal Railroad case. There, a consortium of transportation
companies controlled bridges and loading terminals strategically
located on and across the Mississippi River and were thus able to limit
rail traffic across the river.161 In that case the Supreme Court ordered
the association to offer nondiscriminatory access to outsiders. In
Alaska Airlines the Ninth Circuit distinguished Terminal Railroad,
pointing out that under the CRS system in this case a single firm
controlled the system and the other airlines were merely licensees.162
That answer is a good description of the differences in property
rights, but it does not set our minds at ease that the defendant’s conduct
was competitively harmless. Alaska Airlines exposes an important
difficulty in the antitrust treatment of networks. Some are operated
160

948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
161
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (2912).
162
Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 542 (noting that Terminal Railroad involved
concerted conduct while the present case did not).
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collaboratively by multiple parties and their anticompetitive actions
toward outsiders can be addressed under §1 of the Sherman Act. If a
network is operated by a single firm and other participating firms are
merely licensees or authorized users, then §1 may not apply. Section
2 does not offer comparable relief even though the competition issue
is the same.
One clear historical example of this is the telephone system,
which migrated from a dominated network controlled by a single firm
to ownership by thousands of individual participants. For example,
the essential facility claim that MCI successfully brought against
AT&T for refusal to interconnect with MCI’s wireless services was
almost entirely under §2 of the Sherman Act.163 The Seventh Circuit’s
decision that a denial of interconnection was unlawful under the
essential facility doctrine may not have survived the Supreme Court’s
Trinko decision,164 particularly given the fact that interconnection is
now mandated by statute. However, the network itself is operated by
multiple firms and many of its actions are challengeable under §1.165
So on the one hand accepting an abuse of dominance theory
might lead to significant competitive improvement in networked
markets. On the other, it could easily threaten anticompetitive overuse
if not kept within proper boundaries. One promising approach would
be to use the important limitations that the Clayton Act places on the
conduct that it governs. The three liability-creating provisions in the
Clayton Act are §§2, 3, & 7, which reach a form of price
discrimination,166 tying and exclusive dealing,167 and mergers.168 In
all three the reach of liability is limited by language requiring conduct
163

MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir 1983). The antitrust claim also included some allegations of
conspiracy in restraint of trade, but these §1 claims were eliminated on a
directed verdict. Id. at 1092-1093.
164
Verizon Comm’s, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004). See discussion supra, text at notes __.
165
For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) dismissed the antitrust complaint for inadequate proof
of agreement, but the Court clearly assumed that a proven agreement could
be challenged under §1 of the Sherman Act.
166
15 U.S.C. §13 (2018).
167
15 U.S.C. §14 (2018).
168
15 U.S.C. §18 (2018).
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whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly.” That language still requires a showing of
competitive harm but reaches a broader range of behavior than current
§2 standing alone.
Problematic Exclusionary Practices
The following discussion does not cover the full range of
exclusionary practices that have been challenged as Sherman Act §2
violations.169 Rather, it focuses on particular practices that are in need
of rethinking, particularly for digital or networked markets. Part of the
problem is the lingering effects of many years of Chicago School
rigidity that continues to stifle progress in §2 jurisprudence. Much of
existing §2 doctrine was developed in the context of free-standing
dominant firms where the need for collaboration or interoperability
was minimal. As firms are more networked and interactive,
exclusionary behavior can be more threatening to competition. We
should begin with the premise that even highly networked markets can
be made to work competitively and antitrust has an important role in
facilitating that outcome.
The existing language of the antitrust laws should not interfere
with this result. Their highly general language embraces all
anticompetitive practices with the only qualification that they be part
of “commerce.” So existing law should readily accommodate changes
in technology. One irony is that the very reluctance of the judiciary to
be more flexible in interpretation will yield statutory changes that are
likely to be much more rigid and overreaching. But that could be the
situation we are facing.
The discussion is organized under these headings: 1) Vertical
Integration, Refusal to deal and Self-preferencing; 2) Mergers as
Exclusionary Practices; 3) Anticompetitive Product Design and
Restraints on Innovation; 4) Strategic, exclusionary Pricing; and 5)
Anticompetitive Intellectual Property Practices. Nothing about this
division of topics is compelled or even suggested by the language of
169

For that see volumes 3, 3A, & 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (5th ed. 2022) (in press); or, for briefer
treatment, HERBERT, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, Chs. 6,7
& 8 (6th ed. 2020).
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the statute. Further, many §2 complaints allege a mixture of these
practices as well as others.

Vertical Integration: Refusal to Deal and “Self-Preferencing”
The antitrust doctrine of unilateral refusal to deal170 is almost
always a response to some form of vertical integration. Typically, the
defendant is a firm that operates in two markets, although in some
cases the two levels may be complementary products rather than
vertically related. In any event, the dominant firm has monopoly
power in one market, such as the incumbent phone network.171 It
refuses to sell a vertically related or complementary product, or else
fails to share its dominant asset for purposes of distribution into the
secondary market.
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States172 the defendant was a
large utility that generated its own electricity. The injured rivals in
whose behalf the government sued were small, mainly municipal
utilities that lacked their own generation capacity. They provided
electricity to their own customers by purchasing it at wholesale and
then having it transported, or “wheeled” to their own territories. Otter
Tail refused to wheel power to small utilities adjacent to its own
system, at least partly in a bid to force them to sell out to Otter Tail.
The government’s complaint did not request that the small utilities
share Otter Tail’s generation facilities directly but rather that Otter Tail
be required to wheel power to them so that they could resell it to their
own customers.173 That is, the refusal occurred in the downstream
distribution market rather than Otter Tail’s primary market for
generation.
In the Court’s next big refusal to deal case, Aspen Skiing Co.
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,174 the plaintiff owned a single skiing
By contrast, collaborative refusals to deal, or “boycotts,” are addressed
more aggressively under §1 of the Sherman Act.
171
E.g., Verizon Comm’s, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004). See discussion supra, text at notes __.
172
410 U.S. 366 (1973).
173
Id. at 368-369. The injunction also prevented Otter Tail from entering into
any contract that forbad sharing power with adjacent utilities.
174
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
170
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mountain and had been participating in a joint marketing venture with
the defendant, who owned three. Under the “All Aspen” ticket that
they sold, skiers could use lifts and slopes on any of the four
mountains. The dispute arose when the defendant reneged on the
venture agreement without a good business justification. The plaintiff
was not requesting to operate on the defendant’s three mountains, nor
to share any of its facilities. Under the venture operation each firm
operated these things separately. Rather, the plaintiff requested
continuation of the joint marketing arrangement175 as well as treble
damages for loss of business.176
Antitrust challenges to refusals to deal in secondary markets
often get blurred into the antitrust law of tying or exclusive dealing
although often they do not meet all of the technical requirements of
those doctrines.177 For example, so called tech ties, in which a
defendant unites two products by technological design, may not satisfy
the requirements for tying but they can then be attacked under §2. 178
Some contractual ties can operate the same way when the defendant
refuses to sell a good unless the purchaser also takes a different good.
A good illustration of this blurring of legal doctrine is Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Services, Inc,179 in which the defendant, a
nondominant manufacturer of high-speed photocopiers, refused to sell
repair parts except through its own contract maintenance personnel.
The plaintiffs were independent service organizations (ISOs) unable to
obtain the parts they needed to repair Kodak machines. The complaint
included claims under both §1 of the Sherman Act for tying of parts
and service, and §2 for the simple refusal to sell the parts to
175

See Id. a 598 n.23.
Id. at 598
177
See Erik Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Duty to Deal in the Age of Big Tech,
__
YALE
L.J.
(2022)
(forthcoming)
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3889774. See also
Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 837 (1990); Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying,
Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory, 32 RAND J. ECON. 52 (2001);
Dennis Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve
and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194
(2002).
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See discussion supra, text at notes __.
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504 U,S. 451 (1992).
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independents repair technicians. The Supreme Court denied summary
judgment in an opinion addressed almost exclusively to the tying
claim. The case was remanded and in the subsequent litigation the
plaintiff withdrew the tying claim.180 While the reason was not stated,
it was very likely because of doubts about whether the challenged
conduct was appropriately multilateral rather than unilateral.
Notwithstanding that withdrawal, the plaintiff prevailed at trial on the
unilateral refusal to deal claim, relying on the same damages study that
was in the record for the tying claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
approving jury instructions that had been taken from the Aspen Skiing
case.181 Once again, however, the plaintiffs were not requesting that
Kodak shares it production facilities for the photocopiers themselves;
rather they wanted access to parts so that they could compete in the
downstream markets for servicing.
Since the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Trinko, LLP,182 the federal judiciary has been
highly restrictive of §2 claims challenging refusals to deal. Verizon
was an incumbent local exchange telephone carriers (“ILEC”) which
controlled the backbone of the phone system in its territory. The 1996
Telecommunications Act required Verizon to interconnect seamlessly
with smaller firms that wanted to operate a subset of services (CLEC’s,
or “competitive local exchange carriers”), but that Act did not
authorize private enforcement, and certainly not for antitrust’s treble
damages. Deficiencies in the quality of interconnection provoked the
dispute, in which the plaintiff in essence requested the court to make
the interconnection obligation enforceable under the antitrust laws.
Although Trinko arose entirely within the context of an
elaborate communications network operated by numerous rival firms,
the Court’s analysis of the dealing claims paid virtually no attention to
that fact. Indeed, the principal reference to the network in Justice
Scalia’s opinion was to make the point that if sharing is legally
obligatory, as it was under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, then
Aspen Skiing’s approach did not apply. In Aspen the Court had held
that unjustified termination of a voluntary dealing agreement could be
180

Image Tech. Services v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.
1997).
181
Id. at 1209.
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540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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used as evidence to support an unlawful refusal to deal claim. 183 That
was not the case in Trinko, where the dealing obligation was statutorily
imposed.
Trinko thus has little to say about voluntarily created networks,
such as the FRAND system. There, one of the most significant threats
to network competition results from reliance and path dependence. In
order to maintain competition in a FRAND network the firms must
agree to make their technology available to one another without
discrimination as between rivals and non-rivals. As long as the
network can be made to confirm to those requirements competition can
be robust. In today’s economy networks can create enormous value,
and collaboratively operated networks can produce more value than
dominated ones.
The FRAND commitment is a form of incomplete contract, and
they are enforced in the first instance by contract law. Enforcing
contracts is not antitrust’ purpose, but neither is the existence of a
contract a defense if conduct falls within antitrust’s reach. From its
inception the Sherman Act has been enforced against practices that
were also covered by a contract. Indeed, United States v. TransMissouri, the Supreme Court’s first antitrust decision on the merits was
an antitrust challenge to an elaborate and written contract.184
The concerns of antitrust are both narrower and broader than
contract law. They are narrower to the extent that only a few FRAND
disputes raise antitrust issues. But when a practice threatens
competition on the network, then antitrust has an important role. This
is something that the Ninth Circuit together with the Justice
Department lost sight of in the Qualcomm litigation.185
One important role of antitrust in FRAND networks as well as
others is to guarantee competition in the presence of path dependence
and ex post opportunism – essentially the facts of the Qualcomm
litigation.186 Patent owners contemplating participation on a network
make obligations to license out their patents on fair, reasonable, and
183

See discussion supra, text at notes __.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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supra, text at notes __.
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nondiscriminatory terms, receiving the same promises in return. The
immediate result is an immense increase in value because the network
itself is so critical. Further, the FRAND system can be expected to
generate significant path dependence in subsequent development.
Individual firms design their products and processes in reliance on the
fact that they have access to the technology that they need, provided
that technology is part of the network’s FRAND portfolio. Voluntary
inclusion in FRAND is thus a special case of bidding for monopoly
status: one way to avoid excessive regulation for monopoly technology
is to facilitate bidding for participation, with the winning bidders
promising to deliver on competitive terms.187
Having made this commitment and after development has
proceeded the network becomes much more valuable. Now things
change. Individual participants have an incentive to renege on their
commitments. They may wish to license selectively to noncompetitors
only, to avoid licensing at all in order to bolster their own positions, or
to insist on higher royalties than the FRAND system contemplates.
Any one of these things could be a breach of contract, but if reduces
output and results in higher prices it becomes an antitrust problem as
well.
“Sacrifice”
The Aspen refusal to deal rule has been needlessly limited by a
“sacrifice” test that permits a finding of illegality only when the
dominant firm’s termination of an earlier deal involves a sacrifice of
short-term gains in prospect of long run profits. Neither the success
nor the anticompetitive effects of refusals to deal need require a
“sacrifice” of short-run profits. The fact of costly commitments and
subsequent extraction can produce gains to the dominant firm
immediately just as it is harming competition.
In Aspen itself the Court noted that the jury was entitled to find
such a sacrifice, although it did not make illegality hinge on that fact.
Further, whether there was an actual sacrifice is doubtful. The
plaintiff’s market position declined immediately after the refusal and
the defendant’s market position increased.188 Indeed, that is what one
would expect in many such cases: by terminating the joint venture or
187
188
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other enterprise the plaintiff’s harm would be almost immediate. To
be sure, the defendant lost revenue to the extent that the terminated
venture had benefitted its own business, but it would make it up from
its larger share. That is exactly what happened in Aspen itself. The
“all-Aspen” ticket that the defendant terminated had been mildly
popular, so ending it reduced revenue from sales of that combination.
Offsetting this, however, the defendant’s market share increased
significantly. That is, the refusal worked just like exclusive dealing:
to the extent it raises prices it reduces overall market revenues, but at
the same time it increases the defendant’s share of those revenues. The
refusal is profitable immediately if the gains from the higher share
offset the losses from the reduced size of the overall market. Indeed,
such refusals are more likely to occur as the gains are more immediate
and certain. So the “sacrifice” test is looking for the wrong thing.
The “sacrifice” test is particularly harmful in cases that involve
reliance and path dependence. This is a particular problem in dynamic
markets. For this reason the Ninth Circuit lost an important
opportunity to prevent Qualcomm from undermining the FRAND
patent licensing program.
Refusal to Deal, “Self-Preferencing,” and Copying
One remaining refusal to deal question concerns conduct where
there is neither an existing statutory duty to deal, as in Trinko, or a
previous joint dealing agreement that the defendant repudiated, as in
Aspen. For example, should a firm such as Facebook or Amazon have
a duty to share platform access or information with rivals that wish
either to interconnect with it or make sales there?
“Self-preferencing” deals with concerns that fall into antitrust
refusal to deal law, although it can also reach anticompetitive
agreements. Indeed, a fair amount of current antitrust law addresses
forms of self-preferencing. For example, the law of tying and
exclusive dealing limits the ability of manufacturers to insist that
dealers limit sales to the manufacturer’s own brands.189 Other practices
189

E.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.
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that are sometimes termed “quasi” exclusive dealing include discounts
conditioned on dealers taking a minimum share of their needs from
that supplier, or if a dealer agrees to purchase a seller’s entire bundle
of products.190 So-called “tech ties,” or technological ties, generate
self-preferencing by making the manufacturer’s secondary good
compatible only with its own primary devices. For example, Keurig,
a maker of coffee brewing machines, unsuccessfully attempted to
reengineer its popular pod-style coffee maker so that it was compatible
only with Keurig’s own proprietary coffee pods. These had previously
been sold competitively by numerous firms. Not only did the
experiment fail in the market, it also embroiled Keurig in antitrust
litigation which is ongoing at this writing.191 In addition, antitrust
policy limits the use of most-favored-nation agreements (MFNs),
which require a firm’s suppliers to charge higher prices to competing
firms.192 Finally, the Robinson-Patman Act, prohibits some situations

Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1103
(1995) (similar); Blanton Enterp. V. Burger King Corp., 680 F.Supp.753
(D.S.C. 1988) (similar requirement treated as exclusive dealing).
190
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding jury verdict
that defendant unlawfully offered discounts conditioned on purchase of a
bundle of its products).
191
In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litigation,
383 F.Supp.3d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). See also In re Keurig Green Mountain
Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 2021 (WL 1393336 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,
2021) (granting Illinois and Florida right to intervene in behalf of indirect
purchasers).
192
See Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement
Against Platform MFNs, 127 YALE L.J. 2176, 2181-86 (2018). Amazon
has formerly used them but subsequently eliminated at least some of them.
See Makena Kelly, Amazon Silently Ends Controversial Pricing Agreements
With Sellers, THE VERGE (Mar. 11, 2019), available at
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/11/18260700/amazon-anti-competitivepricing-agreements-3rd-party-sellers-end.
But see Compl., Dist. Of
Columbia v. Amazon.Com, Inc., Civ. Ct. No. ____ (D.D.C. May 25, 2021)
(complaining about remaining MFNs). The complaint, ¶30, references an
Amazon “Fair Pricing Policy” as requiring the Amazon’s third party sellers
to set a price on Amazon’s platform that is equal to or lower than the price it
sets
on
any
competing
platform.
See
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/external/G5TUVJKZHUVMN77
V (last visited Oct 31, 2021).
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when a firm sells to competing dealers at different prices.193
So antitrust law already has a toolbox for dealing with
anticompetitive self-preferencing. Legislation under consideration at
this writing would go further. Depending on what emerges, proposed
legislation could address situations where a firm:
•

Charges lower prices on its website for its own products than third
parties do for their competing products;

•

Give its own products an advantaged position in a product search
or in a tool such as Amazon’s “buy box,” which gives alternative
results for a particular product search.194

•

Simply sells its own products in competition with third-party
products; or selects some but not all of the third party makers of a
particular product.

•

Reverse engineers and copies products that it is selling for a third
party, perhaps by relying on confidential information provided to
Amazon by the third party.195

Depending on what emerges, some of these provisions could
conflict with long established policies developed under the antitrust
law. For example, the law of exclusive dealing has traditionally
favored “multi-branding,” or sellers who sell multiple brands from the
same dealer or store.196 Major retailers from Wal-Mart to Macy’s have
always dealt in multiple brands, frequently displayed side-by-side in
the same store. Amazon in particular is an anti-exclusive dealing
platform; it generally carries numerous brands of the same product,
including rivals’ brands in addition to its own. This forces individual
suppliers to set competitive prices and maximizes consumer choice
193

15 U.S.C. §13 (2018). See discussion infra, text at notes __.
See Erik Hovenkamp, Refusal to Deal, supra note __.
195
See Investigation of Competition in Digital markets, Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the
Judiciary (2020), available at competition_in_digital_markets.pdf
(house.gov)
196
E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (condemning
defendant’s imposition of exclusive branding on its gasoline stations); United
States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (condemning
defendant’s rules that required dealers to sell its product exclusively).
194
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within that store. By contrast, strong self-preferencing legislation may
force a firm such as Amazon to single brand – that is, to make a choice
between selling its own goods or the competing goods of rivals on its
website, but not both. In effect, depending on the legislation that is
passed it could exclude products by making it more difficult for either
Amazon itself or else for other firms to sell them in competition on the
same site.
As explained above, an “abuse of dominance” standard could
address these issues more effectively than these specific statutory
proposals, without causing unnecessary overreaching.197 Such a
standard must be interpreted to as to identify abuses that harm
competition in a meaningful way. First, it would apply to all dominant
platforms, with dominance measured by established antitrust criteria.
That would certainly reach more firms than Amazon, Apple, Google,
and Facebook. Second, the “abuse” requirement would enable judges
to identify abuse in the particular situation before it and avoid
problems of under-coverage or over-deterrence.
The reverse engineering or copying problem sounds more in
intellectual property than antitrust, including the law of utility and
design patents, copyright, and trademark. The IP laws permit – indeed,
even encourage -- firms to copy and compete freely in public domain
goods or technology.198 Exclusive IP rights incentivize innovation,
while copying incentives dissemination. Technological progress
requires both, and we rely on IP law to determine the appropriate
boundary between them. So in the first instance this issue seems best
handled as a matter of intellectual property policy.
The real bite of any Congressional self-preferencing provision
must be some set of products that do not have relevant intellectual
property protection and where we think copying by a firm such as
Amazon is unjust for some other reason. Assuming that monopoly is
197

See discussion supra, text at notes __.
E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989) (limitations in Patent Act intended to protect competition in the
public domain); see also id. at 160-161 (noting extent to which IP law
encourages reverse engineering); Pfaff v. Wells Electr., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 65
(1898) (“the patent laws … seek both to protect the public’s right to retain
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not threatened in the secondary market, the antitrust legality of copying
a public domain product might still be examined under an abuse of
dominance standard. However, a court would have to tread carefully
in order to avoid conflict with the IP laws.199
Limiting a firm’s power to copy things that are in the public
domain requires a justification. Important organizations such as
Creative Commons,200 the Open Source Initiative,201 and the Center
for the Study of the Public Domain202 are only a few of those dedicated
to the proposition that a great deal of the dissemination of valuable
things comes from the existence of a robust public domain. This
impulse shows up powerfully, for example, in our treatment of patent
pharmaceutical drugs, where we have a strong policy, enacted in the
Hatch-Waxman Act,203 of encouraging copying of drugs whose
patents have expired.204 In sum, we should not jump too nimbly from
the well established premise that copying of things in the public
domain should be encouraged, to the conclusion that it becomes bad if
one of the dominant platforms does it.
Another danger of thoughtless self-preferencing rules is that
they will harm the very interests they are intended to protect. A case
in point is Standard Oil Co. v. United States (“Standard Stations”). The
Supreme Court condemned Standard Oil’s policy requiring its retail
services stations to sell its own gasoline exclusively.205 The practice
that the Court condemned, sometimes described as “single
branding,”206 forbad a franchised gasoline station holding itself out as
199

See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001) (protecting a particular functional design feature in the guise of trade
dress would hinder competition).
200
https://creativecommons.org/.
201
https://opensource.org/
202
https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/.
203
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355,
360cc; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271).
204
E.g., FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (2013) (limiting power of
pharmaceutical patentees to use pay-for-delay settlements to restrain third
party development of generic drugs).
205
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States ,337 U.S. 293 (1949).
206
Particularly in EU law. See e.g., Frank Wijckmans, de Minimis Treatment
of Exclusive Purchase (Single Branding) Obligations, 6 J. EUR. COMP. L. &
PRACTICE 413 (2015).
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a Standard station from selling a second brand of gasoline. Justice
Douglas wrote a strong dissent – a fact that is nothing less than
shocking, given that Douglas was one of the most pro-enforcement
Justices in the history of antitrust. In fact, Justice Douglas began his
dissent reciting numerous ways in which he believed the antitrust laws
were underenforced – “the teeth have largely been drawn from the
Act”207 and the “lessons Brandeis taught on the curse of bigness have
largely been forgotten in high places.”208
So why the dissent from an opinion that condemned a vertical
restraint? It was based on his prescient prediction that eliminating
exclusive dealing “sets the stage for Standard and other oil companies
to build service-station empires of their own.”209 Not being able to
impose exclusive dealing on independent stations selling its gasoline,
the oil companies would “build service station empires of their own”
through “the outright acquisitions of them” by Standard’s subsidiary
corporations.210 Prohibited from organizing distribution in ways that
maximized its output a firm such as Amazon might just as easily
comply with a statute by not dealing with third parties at all, thus
removing them from the platform. This outcome would not benefit
anyone.

Exclusionary Mergers
For twenty-five years the Sherman Act was the country’s only
federal merger statute.211 Coverage was expanded in 1914 by §7 of the
Clayton Act. The government’s loss in the United States Steel merger
case, brought prior to the Clayton Act’s passage, indicates the Sherman

207

Id. at 317 (Douglas, j., dissenting)
Id. at 318.
209
Id. at 320.
210
Ibid.
211
E.g., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)
(condemning railroad merger to monopoly under Sections 1 & 2 of the
Sherman Act); United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922)
(same; not applying Clayton Act because the suit had been brought on Feb.
11, 1914, eight months prior to Clayton Act’s enactment on Oct. 15, 1914).
Both the decisions in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911);
and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911)
208
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Act’s shortcomings.212 The Court concluded that the merger did not
create a monopoly and was thus not unlawful. That was so
notwithstanding that the challenge had been brought under both §1 and
§2 of the Sherman Act, and only §2 requires creation of monopoly.213
While the explanation is unclear, the best one seems to be that the
industry was expanding rapidly, and the acquisitions were found not
to have reduced output at all.214
Section 7 of the Clayton Act sought to remedy that by
condemning acquisitions where the “effect may be substantially to
lessen competition” as an alternative to tending “to create a
monopoly.”215 Two features of original §7 limited its usefulness. First
was its language addressing the lessening of competition “between”
the merging firms, which largely limited its reach to horizontal
mergers. Only mergers of competitors or potential competitors reduce
competition between the merging partners.216 Second, original §7
applied only to stock acquisitions, and firms wishing to merge found
it easy to avoid §7 by engaging in acquisitions of assets – a mere
transactional formality.217 Since its 1950s amendments, the merger
212

See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F.55, 178 (D.N.J. 1915)
(action had been brought Oct. 26, 1911), aff’d 251 U.S. 417, 44 (1920)
(noting that “the corporation did not achieve monopoly”).
213
See 223 F.55 at 58. Justice Day’s dissent from the Supreme Court’s
affirmance protested that the acquisitions did in fact restrain trade, even
though they may have been unsuccessful in creating a monopoly. 251 U.S.
at 458.
214
See 223 F. at 67.
215
15 U.S.C. §26 (2018).
216
As originally enacted, §7 provided:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such
acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition
between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain
such commerce in any section or community, or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
38 Stat. 730, 731. (statute of October 15, 1914, c. 323).
217
See, e.g., FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926) (§7 did not apply
to asset acquisitions).
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statute has been interpreted much more aggressively, and today we
tend to think of the Sherman Act as an inferior vehicle.
That is not clear from the statutory language. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act reaches “combinations” in restraint of trade, and that was
how early merger cases used it.218 Further, the most generally
understood meaning of “restraint of trade” at common law was
practices that threatened anticompetitive output reductions.219
Literally, a merger that threatened an anticompetitive output decrease
and corresponding increase in price would have satisfied that
definition, and those are largely the criteria we use to evaluate mergers
today. It would not matter what the underlying theory of the merger
was, whether collusion-facilitating, unilateral effects, or merger to
monopoly. All would be covered. In this case, as in so many others,
the meaning of the Sherman Act evolved so as to reflect the case law
rather than the literal language of the statutes. Here, the insistence in
early decisions such as United States Steel that the Sherman Act
reaches only mergers to monopoly was a departure. In any event, in
the relatively few cases that continue to apply the Sherman Act today,
the courts treat the reach of the two statutes as the same.220

See Northern Securities, 193 U.S. 327 (“This combination is, within the
meaning of the act, a ‘trust;’ but if not, it is a combination in restraint of
interstate and international commerce; and that is enough to bring it under
the condemnation of the act.”).
219
See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, supra note __.
220
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990) (although merger may not have been
covered by §7 for jurisdictional reasons, mergers are condemned by the
Clayton and Sherman Acts under the same standards). The court observed:
We doubt whether there is a substantive difference today between
the standard for judging the lawfulness of a merger challenged under
section 1 of the Sherman Act and the standard for judging the same
merger challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act…. A
transaction violates section 1 of the Sherman Act if it restrains trade;
it violates the Clayton Act if its effect may be substantially to lessen
competition. But both statutory formulas require, and have received,
judicial interpretation; and the interpretations have, after three
quarters of a century, converged.
218
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Attacking a merger as a combination in restraint of trade is an
interpretation of §1 of the Sherman Act, not §2.221 Here, §2 would
appear to reach more narrowly because it challenges only
monopolizing conduct. A merger that merely facilitated a price
increase in the collusion sense would not be “monopolizing,” at least
not if it fell short of creating a monopoly. In any event, application of
either §2 of the Sherman Act or §7 of the Clayton Act should be clear
when the purpose of the acquisition is to keep a competitive firm off
the market entirely – at least in those circumstances when dominance
is realistically threatened or prolonged.
The Federal Trade Commission’s complaint against Facebook
challenges FB’s acquisitions of Instagram and Whatsapp under §2 of
the Sherman Act rather than either §1 or §7 of the Clayton Act. Section
7 clearly applies. At this writing, whether omitting a §7 claim was a
good litigation strategy remains to be seen. Much depends on the
market definition that the court is willing to accept. A merger
challenged under traditional §7 grounds might require a market share
no greater than 30% or so. That would very likely not be enough to
support a Sherman §2 challenges.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns “exclusionary”
practices. By contrast, today nearly all enforcement of the merger law
under the government’s Guidelines addresses concerns more properly
likened to collusion. That is, they harm competition by reducing
competition between the merging firms or else among all of the
competitors in the market in which the merger is challenged. The
reach of private merger enforcement can be broader, reaching
exclusionary conduct such as dealer terminations resulting from a
merger.222
President Biden’s Executive Order on Competitiveness223
encourages the Antitrust Agencies to consider revising the Merger

898 F.2d at 1281.
221

E.g., Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d 1278
E.g., Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690 (4th Cir.
2021) (successful merger challenge by terminated dealer).
223
Exec. Order No. 14036 on Promoting Competition in the American
Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021), §1 (“the Attorney General and
222
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Guidelines. Should they do so, one thing on the agenda should be
addition of a section addressing mergers such as the numerous
acquisitions of small firms made by the large digital platforms. Here,
the more realistic threat is not collusion-like behavior but rather
removal of potential competitors before they have had a chance to
grow to maturity.
In addition, so-called “killer” acquisitions are best analyzed as
exclusionary rather than collusion facilitating practices. 224 Killer
acquisition have a long history going back to the 1911 American
Tobacco case prior to the passage of the Clayton Act. The defendant
was condemned in part for engaging in the “…persistent expenditure
of millions upon millions of dollars in buying out plants, not for the
purpose of utilizing them, but in order to close them up and render
them useless….”225
A merger plus shutdown of the acquired assets deserves harsh
treatment because such acquisitions virtually never produce plausible
cost savings. The only reason we subject mergers of competitors to
something less than per se scrutiny is the belief that there might be
offsetting efficiencies that makes the merger productive on balance.
However, the only realistic effect of a killer acquisition is removal of
the rival’s acquired assets from the market. That makes it very little
different from a cartel, which we routinely condemn without
examining effects.226
The enforcement treatment, however, should be based on ex
ante rather than ex post analysis. Not all mergers work out. As a result,

the Chair of the FTC are encouraged to review the horizontal and vertical
merger guidelines and consider whether to revise those guidelines”).
224
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram are not killer
acquisitions – both assets are still in active production.
225
United States v. American Tobacco Co, 221 U.S. 106, 182 (1911); see also
id. at 164 n. 5, which includes a list of firms that were closed as soon as they
were purchased. See also United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859,
875 (D.Md. 1916) (purchase and shutdown of rival can companies); United
States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 F. 502 (E.D.Pa. 1915) (condemning
defendant in part for acquiring interests in firms and shutting hem down).
226
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J.
1952, 2045-2048 (2021).
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some failed acquisitions must subsequently be spun off.227 A firm
should not be condemned if it realistically planned on putting the
acquired assets to productive use but things subsequently did not go as
planned. Here the best approach would be to inquire whether an
acquisition was made in good faith with production in mind, or
whether the plan from the beginning was to shut it down.

Anticompetitive Product Design and Restraints on Innovation
The successful introduction of a new or significantly revised
product often injures rivals committed to other technologies. Major
innovations, such as the automobile, the plain paper copier, or
handheld electronic calculator often wipe out entire markets for
products such as horses and buggies, mimeograph machines, and slide
rules that subsequently became obsolete. Notwithstanding this fact
there is almost no antitrust case law approving “direct,” primary
market challenges to innovation as anticompetitive. As the Ninth
Circuit once put it,
To accept CalComp's [the plaintiff competitor’s] position
would be to hold that IBM could not compete if competition
would result in injury to its competitors, an ill-advised reversal
of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the Sherman Act
is meant to protect the competitive process, not competitors. 228
Today the consensus is very robust that a product improvement
in and of itself is protected from antitrust challenge. Arguably there is
a tradeoff worth measuring between the amount of benefit that an
innovation confers on consumers and others, and the amount of harm
227

Most notably, Time-Warner/AT&T, which beat a Justice Department
vertical merger challenge but later spun the acquired assets off as an
acquisition failure. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029
(D.C.Cir. 2019); and see Jon Brodkin, AT&T to Spin Off WarnerMedia,
Basically Admitting Giant Merger Was a Mistake (ArsTechnica, May 17,
2021), available at https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/05/att-to-spinoff-warnermedia-will-try-to-act-like-a-telecom-company-again/.
228
See, e.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. (“CalComp”) v. IBM Corp.,
613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting competitor’s claim that IBM’s
introduction of smaller and faster computers “at a ‘much cheaper’ cost of
design and manufacture” was “technological manipulation”).
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it causes to rivals, but the courts consistently reject any claims
challenging innovation caused by product designs on that basis.229
One Ninth Circuit decision rejected as speculative a smaller
rival’s claim that IBM’s introduction of new computer models had to
consider “impact costs,” or a reduction in profits on the old line
resulting from its obsolescence. The theory was presented as a form
of predatory pricing: even though the new model was sold at a fully
profitable price, that might not be true if one subtracted the unrealized
revenue that might have been earned on the old model had the new one
not been introduced.230 The plaintiff was saying, in effect, that in
considering the impact of a new product one had to subtract all the
profits that would have been earned on older versions that had now
become obsolete. In addition to being a measurement nightmare, such
a theory would impose tremendous threats to innovation.
Nearly all of the challenges to product changes claimed to be
innovations, including the relatively few successful ones, occur in
markets for complementary or vertically related products. The
challenge is not to harm caused by innovation of a primary product,
but rather to unreasonably exclusionary behavior in a complementary,
or secondary, product. As a result, the antitrust analysis is very similar
to the one that applies to refusals to deal.231 That is, even dominant
firms are generally able to innovate in their primary market without
antitrust concern about harm to rivals. However, cognizable injuries
in related markets are possible, although they are usually analyzed as
technological ties, which borrows at least some doctrine from the law
of tying arrangements.
For example, Berkey Photo challenged Kodak’s simultaneous
introduction of a new camera and new film that was compatible only

229

Allied Orthodpedic Appliances, Inv. V. Tyco Health Care Group, LP, 592
F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (“there is no room in this analysis for balancing
the benefits or worth of a product improvement against its anticompetitive
effects”).
230
Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1383 n 3
th
(9 Cir. 1983).
231
See discussion supra, text at notes ___; and Erik Hovenkamp, Refusal to
Deal, supra note __.
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with the camera.232 The Federal Circuit’s decision in C.R. Bard, Inc.
v. M3 Sys., was concerned with Bard’s introduction of a redesigned
hypodermic gun for taking skin biopsies, together with its redesigned
disposable needles that eliminated the generic and competitive market
for needles.233 The principal challenge in the Microsoft case was not
Windows dominance as such in its primary market, which might
exclude rival operating systems. Rather, it focused on the harm to a
complementary product, namely Netscape’s internet browser.
This harm can occur in the secondary market even if the
conduct falls short of creating a monopoly there. That is why the tying
analogy has proven so useful: tying requires market power in the tying
product, but not the creation of monopoly in the secondary product.234
For example, if a redesign of product A transforms the complementary
B market from a highly competitive generic to one in which the
defendant acquires 40% of the secondary product it could do enormous
harm to rivals, consumers, and others. It could be treated analytically
as a tech. tie, but not realistically as monopolization of the secondary
market.
In Microsoft, the defendant dominated the operating system
market (with Windows), but the court found that a browser market was
never properly defined.235 As a result the attempt to monopolize claim
faltered because it requires a market definition of the market in which
the attempt occurred.236 There was also a tying claim involving the
operating system and the browser that the court remanded under the
rule of reason and was subsequently dropped.237 The court did
condemn a tech tie on the theory that Microsoft “commingled” the
Windows and browser code into the same program, making it
impossible to acquire one without the other.238 The tech tie claim
232

Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See the discussion, supra, note __, on
“leveraging” claims in the same decision.
233
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
234
See 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶1731-1733 (4th ed 2019).
235
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
236
Ibid. See discussion supra, text at notes __, and Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 448 (1993).
237
Id. at 84-91 (remanding tying came for analysis under rule of reason).
238
Id. at 66-67.
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under §2 requires dominance in the primary product and requires
foreclosure in the secondary product.
Once again, defining the monopolization offense as “abuse of
dominance” could go far toward addressing these problems when there
is no realistic danger that the conduct will fall short of realizing
monopoly in the secondary market.239 The danger is that under such a
standard “abuse” could be interpreted to include many tort-like injuries
that do not amount to injuries to competition or, worse yet, are actually
procompetitive. Nevertheless, an abuse of dominance standard can be
a useful tool for examining product changes that cause unnecessary
harm to complementary products – particularly those that threaten
generic competition in secondary markets. For this reason, as
developed below, the courts have generally imposed a “no benefit”
rule. A dominant firm’s product redesign that alters a complementary
product can be challenged if it is not in any way superior but serves
only to make rival complementary products incompatible.240
More specifically, antitrust policy should take a position that
favors innovation, but with a few limitations. Liability should be
limited to situations where (1) the product change was not an
improvement; and 2) the defendant never intended for it to be an
improvement, but only to commandeer the market for the
complementary product.
For a time, the academic literature toyed with the idea of
“predatory product innovation,”241 but it never took hold in the case
law. Even in that literature, nearly all identified instances of predatory
product innovation involved modification of secondary products in
order to make them incompatible with rivals’ complementary
products.242

239

See discussion supra, text at notes _.
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
241
Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 yale L.J. 8 (1981).
242
For a critique of the Ordover-Willig model, see Joseph Gregory Sidak,
Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COL. L. REV. 1121 (1983), noting that
it involved firms who made complementary products in order to leverage
sales in the secondary product.
240
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The presence of government regulation can cause some
complicating issues when the regulation itself limits consumer choice.
One prominent example is pharmaceutical “product hopping,” which
has found recognition in the case law.243 This practice involves the
maker of a popular drug who, with patent expiration looming, makes
small modifications and yanks regulatory approval from the older
version in order to force doctors and their patients to migrate to the
new one.244 The result is to prolong effective patent or regulatory
exclusivity.245 The strategy is entirely a consequence of the
defendant’s ability to manipulate a regulatory regime. In the absence
of regulation there is no obvious way that a producer could “hop”
customers from the older version to the new one.
Some primary product redesigns, such as the proverbial Ford
Edsel, are failures. Even in the case of altered complementary
products, failed redesigns should not be a strict liability offense. The
question is not whether ex post the design ends up not being an
improvement. Rather, the question is whether the defendant ever
intended the design to be an improvement, or simply wished to make
a complementary product incompatible. For example, in the Keurig
litigation the defendant modified its product by placing a barcode on
each K-cup that was rationalized as a way that consumers could
identify the particular cup’s recipe. In fact, however, according to the
243

E.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis, PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d
Cir. 2015) (recognizing product-hopping as a §2 theory of harm).
244
The court rejected the argument that limiting product hopping in this case
would restrain innovation:
Defendants have presented no evidence to support their argument
that antitrust scrutiny of the pharmaceutical industry will
meaningfully deter innovation. To the contrary, as the American
Antitrust Institute amici argue, immunizing product hopping from
antitrust scrutiny may deter significant innovation by encouraging
manufacturers to focus on switching the market to trivial or minor
product reformulations rather than investing in the research and
development necessary to develop riskier, but medically significant
innovations.
Id. at 659.
245
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY,
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, & MICHAEL A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW §15.03(b)(1) (3d ed. 2021).
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plaintiff’s claims the only thing that it did is prevent the redesigned
Keurig machine from operating when the cup did not contain the
proprietary barcode. As a result, rivals’ generic K-Cups, which were
extremely popular, could no longer be used.246
In sharp contrast to allegedly anticompetitive innovations,
exclusionary restraints on innovation are conceptually easier to
address because no countervailing policy favors them. They are
harmful, pure and simple, provided that they are properly identified.
For example, n Microsoft the defendant was found to have used its
monopoly power to force Intel to stop its development program of a
“Java-enabled” processor chip, which would have been able to process
instructions across different interfaces.247 Microsoft worried that this
chip would increase the level of compatibility between the Windows
platform and non-Windows computers and thus make alternative
platforms more viable. In this case, Microsoft was not able to offer
any justification.248

Strategic Pricing and the Equally Efficient Rival
The classic theory of predatory pricing is simple to state. A
dominant firm cuts its price to a level below its costs. Because it is
dominant, it can absorb the loss of profits while smaller and weaker
rivals are not. Once the rivals have been destroyed the predator raises
its price to monopoly levels and then enjoys a “recoupment” period of
high profits.

246

See Amended and Supplemental Complaint, In re Keurig Green Mountain
Single-Serve Antitrust Litig. (1:14-cv-00905-VSB, 1:14-md-02542-VSB,
S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2014), available at 2014 WL 7250107. See also in re
Keurig Green Mountain Single-serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., *2, n. 6 2014
WL 12778832 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2014) (denying preliminary injunction and
fnding a likely “factual dispute over whether the technology serves a purpose
in addition to preventing the use of unlicensed portion packs”). See also
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66-67 (D.C.Cir. 2001) (while
commingling of Windows and browser code increased browser’s user share,
“Microsoft failed to meet its burden of showing that its conduct serves a
purpose other than protecting its operating system monopoly.”)
247
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77-79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
248
Id. at 77. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 249-252 (2007).
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Predatory pricing law is one place where the idea of the
“equally efficient” rival makes some sense. Some courts and writers
have suggested that an “equally efficient rival” rule should be used to
define the scope of §2 liability generally – that is, conduct is unlawful
only if it tends to exclude an equally efficient rival.249 Others have
correctly noted, however, that while the standard of exclusion of an
equally efficient rival may be useful in pricing cases it is
underdeterrent elsewhere.250 The reason is simple: multi-firm markets
contain firms with different levels of efficiency and tolerating them is
necessary to attain competitive equilibrium. Even in a competitive
market, the marginal firm is the highest cost firm capable of surviving.
The others, and particularly the dominant firm, will generally have
lower costs.
The reason for maintaining an equally efficient rival test for
exclusionary pricing cases has to do with measurement and the risk of
overdeterrence. We do not have good tools for identifying
anticompetitive above cost pricing; as a result, the courts have quite
consistently clung to cost-based pricing theories of liability.251 The
limit of any cost-based theory is naturally marginal cost or some
surrogate, and that entails that a firm could not exclude an equally
efficient rival as long as its own price were above its costs.
Since the 1980s, the case law on predatory pricing has made it
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to win cases, either because they are
unable to show the appropriate prices below cost, or else because they
cannot show a predictably promising period of recoupment. For one
thing, the amount of specificity needed to prove recoupment has made
249

E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194-95 (2d ed. 2001)
(defining exclusionary conduct generally as that which is “likely in the
circumstances to exclude from the defendant's market an equally or more
efficient competitor”)
250
ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 281 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“equally efficient rival” doctrine might apply to price complaints, but not to
exclusive dealing); Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d
888 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying equally efficient rival rule to discount claim);
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008)
(similar);
251
For fuller treatment of the literature and the case law, see 3A PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶735-741 (5th ed.
2022) (in press).
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the doctrine impossible in all cases except a few where the predicted
recoupment period is very short.252 The Supreme Court’s decision in
Brooke Group v. Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,253 which accomplished this result, did so entirely on the basis
of its strict recoupment requirement rather than pricing.
One problem with Brooke Group was its posture on the
question of oligopoly stability. Brooke Group was brought under
original §2 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits discriminatorily low
prices directed at rivals and does not require monopoly. However, the
Supreme Court adopted Sherman Act standards.254 The theory was not
that predatory pricing was enabling the defendant to create a
monopoly, but rather that it was being used to stabilize an oligopoly.
Predatory pricing in oligopoly is a different phenomenon than
predatory pricing intended to achieve monopoly. In an oligopoly
equilibrium each firm sets prices at a level where its own marginal cost
is equal to its own marginal revenue, just as a monopolist would,
except that marginal revenue is computed from the firm’s “residual”
demand curve. That is the demand after the output of other members
of the oligopoly are considered. Brown & Williamson, the defendant,
was a significant player in this oligopoly, although its own market
share was only about 12%.255
One thing that can happen in oligopoly markets, and did in the
Brooke Group case, is that a firm deviates from the oligopoly by
cutting its price, often leading to a price war. The purpose of predatory
pricing in that setting is not to destroy a firm but rather discipline it so
as to make it conform once again to the oligopoly equilibrium. As a
result, predatory pricing is both more plausible and should be easier to
prove than in cases of monopoly, as the Supreme Court
acknowledged.256 When a firm is faced with destruction from a rival’s
252

Spirit Airlines, Inc. vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir.
2005) (denying summary judgment in predatory pricing case where assets
were mobile and the recoupment period was thus very short).
253
509 U.S. 209 (1993)
254
Id. at 221-223 (equating Robinson-Patman and Sherman Act standards).
255
Id. at 228.
256
See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 228:
From one standpoint, recoupment through oligopolistic price
coordination could be thought more feasible than recoupment
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below cost price it will almost certainly be more tenacious in resisting.
In oligopoly, by contrast, the predator offers the fellow oligopoly
member a carrot: rejoin the fold and your profits will go back up to the
oligopoly level. That is, predatory pricing in oligopoly is a form of
stabilization strategy, in which the predator need only communicate
that raising the price back to the oligopoly level will be more profitable
than continuing to cut.
The plausibility of this strategy depends on the stability of the
underlying oligopoly. The structuralists of the Harvard School often
assumed that certain concentrated market structures made oligopoly
virtually inevitable, and thus they were very stable.257 In sharp
contrast, the members of the Chicago School, led by George Stigler in
economics258 and Robert Bork in Law,259 argued that oligopoly is
unstable, always threatened by a breakout of competition, and as a
result there was little to worry about. Bork in particular concluded that
predatory pricing was such a risky practice that it was irrational.260
Without stating that extreme a conclusion, the Supreme Court ended
up doing largely the same thing, agreeing with the Stigler position that
a predator could not rely on a stable period of recoupment to justify its
predation strategy.261

through monopoly: In the oligopoly setting, the victim itself has an
economic incentive to acquiesce in the scheme. If forced to choose
between cutting prices and sustaining losses, maintaining prices and
losing market share, or raising prices and enjoying a share of
supracompetitive profits, a firm may yield to the last alternative.
257
Turner, Definition of Agreement, supra note __.
258
George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964). See
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs, supra note __.
259
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 221 (1978).
260
Id. Interestingly, Richard Posner did not. See RICHARD POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 219 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that Areeda-Turner test for
predatory pricing was too weak).
261
Brook Group, 509 U.S. at 227-228:
Firms that seek to recoup predatory losses through the conscious
parallelism of oligopoly must rely on uncertain and ambiguous
signals to achieve concerted action. The signals are subject to
misinterpretation and are a blunt and imprecise means of ensuring
smooth cooperation, especially in the context of changing or
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That conclusion seems rather naïve in an industry that had been
subject to lockstep follow the leader pricing for decades.262 Under
Brooke Group oligopolists are able to discipline cheaters more
effectively. Brooke Group largely took the teeth out of the use of
antitrust to pursue below cost pricing as an oligopoly stabilization
device.
Most of the discussions of predatory pricing and the large
digital platforms are not concerned with the oligopoly issue. Uber and
Amazon in particular have faced numerous allegations that they have
engaged in predatory pricing. One district refused to dismiss a
predatory pricing complaint against Uber, brought by an upstart but
failed competitor in the app-driven ride-hailing market.263 That
complaint alleged that Uber for a time charged riders a price lower than
it was paying to the driver in the same transaction.264 Further, Uber
raised its prices once the plaintiff exited.265 In another case involving
Philadelphia, however, the Third Circuit rejected predatory pricing
claims.266 To date, no fully adjudicated case has found predatory
pricing against Uber.

unprecedented market circumstances. This anticompetitive minuet is
most difficult to compose and to perform, even for a disciplined
oligopoly.
See also Id. at 253 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting the oligopoly pricing had
been stable for “about half a century”).
262
The court acknowledged as much. See 509 U.S. at 217
263
SC Innovations, Inc. v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2020 WL 2097611 (N.D.Cal.
May 1, 2020). Cf. Malden Transp., Inc. v. Uber Tech., Inc., 321 F.Supp.3d
174 (D.Mass. 2018) (while Uber’s worldwide revenues were shown in a
report to be lower than its costs, no evidence indicated prices below cost in
the Boston market subject to the litigaton); MacCausland v. Uber Tech., Inc.,
312 F.Supp.3d 209 (D.Mass. 2018) (failure to allege facts showing price
below cost); DeSoto Cab Co., Inc. v. Uber Tech., Inc., 2018 WL 10247483
(N.D.Cal. Sep. 24, 2018) (plaintiff sufficiently alleged prices below cost but
not a likelihood of recoupment); see also Desoto Cab Co., Inc. v. Uber Tech.,
Inc., 2020 WL 10575294 (N.D.Cal. March 25, 2020) (granting plaintiff
another opportunity to amend its complaint).
264
Id. at *3.
265
Ibid.
266
Philadelphia Taxi Assn., Inc. v. Uber Tech., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 340 (3d
Cir. 2018).
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Predatory pricing complaints against Amazon have fared even
more poorly. In United States v. Apple, Inc., the eBooks case, the
Second Circuit briefly discussed the issue but no predation clams had
been brought.267 The other complaints, discussed below, are entirely
in the secondary literature.
While Brooke Group itself clearly needs revisiting, that does
not account for the bulk of the problems in predatory pricing cases
involving digital platforms. The problems with most of the literature
finding predatory pricing fall into one of several categories: 1) failure
to understand the nature of promotional pricing; 2) conclusions drawn
from aggregated data that are not sensitive to the appropriate measures
of cost; 3) failure to appreciate the significance of pricing on two-sided
platforms; or 4) failure to understand specific technologies or the
relevance of high fixed costs.
Promotional pricing is a common feature attending the
introduction of new products. Indeed, it would be difficult to come up
with a worse antitrust rule than one the required a firm’s new entry or
new product offering to be profitable on the very first day. Many,
perhaps most, products go through an initial period in which they are
unprofitable, in the prospect that eventually they will become so.
When considering promotional pricing, the critical distinction
is between attaining profitability as a consequence of getting sales
volume up to a certain minimum level, and attaining monopoly profits
by destroying competitors and creating a monopoly. If fixed costs are
at all substantial a newly introduced product will be unprofitable
simply because sales volume is too low. As it produces more, per unit
costs decline until they intersect the point of profitability. Promotional
pricing can be procompetitive even when the price is “below cost” on
an individual transaction basis. For example, it is not uncommon for

267

See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 342 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting
that the book publishers believed that Amazon was predatorily pricing their
ebooks); for more facts, see the district court’s opinion, 889 F.Supp.2d 623
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting testimony of CEO of book publisher that Amazon
used below cost pricing to establish a dominant position in the ebooks market
just as it was emerging). See the district court’s opinion 952 F.Supp.2d 638,
641-653 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing Apple’s pricing model for ebooks).
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a firm to introduce a new product by giving it away for free – a price
below cost under any measure.268
One important signal that such promotional pricing is
nonpredatory is that the profitability point occurs when the firm’s
market share is still at nondominant levels. The minimum output level
for profitability is ordinarily not a function of the firm’s market share,
but rather of its absolute output. That market share can be relatively
large or small, depending on the overall structure of the market.
A second problem, closely related to promotional pricing, is
the use of aggregated data about profitability. These data suffer from
two problems. First, they typically fail to segregate fixed from variable
costs, and thus often confuse struggling firms with predatory
monopolists. Price determination reflects mainly variable, or marginal
costs. As a result, a firm can often be earning high per transaction
profits on a certain product even though it is losing money because its
overhead (fixed) costs are so high.
Alternatively, multiproduct sellers may be earning a profit
overall even as they are pricing individual goods or services at below
cost. This typically not a monopoly problem at all, but simply one in
revenue maximization across aggregated sales, although it is often
confused with monopoly.269 For example, a tiny pizza joint might
offer free delivery, thus making independent delivery unprofitable for
third-party services. Or a convenience store might sell milk, located
in the back of the store, at below cost because it has a proven
expectation that people who come in will also take higher margin
268

See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶746.
E.g., Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 759760 (2017); Carl T. Bogus, Books and Oliver Oil: Why Antitrust Must Deal
with Consolidated Corporate Power, 52 UNIV. MICH. J. L. REFORM 265, 321
(2019) (arguing that using low prices on ebooks to make Kindle readers more
attractive is anticompetitive; of course, a purchased ebook can be read on any
platform with the free Kindle app, including non-Amazon platforms such as
iPad and the iPhone); Guy A. Rub, Amazon and the New World of Publishing,
14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 367 (2018); Jared Killeen, Throwing
the E-Book at Publishers: What the Apple Case Tells Us About Antitrust Law,
22 J.L. & POL’Y 341 (2013) See Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing
and Recoupment, 113 COL. L. REV. 1695, 1747 (2013).
269
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products as well. If we disaggregate the loss product from the others
we appear to have below cost pricing. But once we put them together
we discover that the offering at below cost is profitable because the
costs are more than offset by increased volume in something else. The
strategy can be profitable and procompetitive for even a tiny firm.
A second problem with aggregated data is that they do not
provide usable information about any individual product. A firm may
be unprofitable even though its margins on particular products are
more than sufficient. Famously, both Uber and Amazon have lost
money for many years of their operation. But jumping from that
observation to a conclusion of predation fails to distinguish
competitively healthy investment in new products from predatory
pricing. More significant is the fact that Amazon has attained
profitability and done so without acquiring a dominant market share in
any particular product with the possible exception of eBooks, although
in readers it is clearly non-dominant.270
A third problem with many popular allegations of predatory
pricing is their failure to appreciate that the firms about which they are
speaking are typically two-sided markets.271 Often the products on one
side of the market, such as Facebook membership, are free and the
revenue is coming in from the other side.272 This problem is really a
variation of the problem of the multi-product firm. One needs to look
at the overall cost/revenue picture and not just at one side. For
example, a magazine may operate in a two-sided market in which it
270

See Worldwide Tablet Shipments Return to Growh (IDC, Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS47423721
(showing
2020 markets shares for tablets as Apple=36.5%, Samsung, 19.4%, Lenovo,
10.7%, and Amazon=6.8%). These are dramatically different from sales of
ebooks themselves, indicating that many people purchase Amazon’s ebooks
in order to read them on non-Amazon devices such as the iPad or iPhone.
However, even today ebooks make up only about 21% of total book sales.
See https://about.ebooks.com/ebook-industry-news-feed/ (last visited Nov.
7, 2021).
271
See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J.CORP.L. 713, 732 (2019)
(noting this error).
272
See, e.g., Ben Bloodstein, Amazon and Platform Antitrust, 88 FORDHAM
L. REV. 187, 210 (2019) (suggesting that use of below cost prices on a twosided market is predatory pricing because it is a way of “getting both sides
on board in pursuit of critical mass”).
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obtains revenue from both subscriptions and advertisements. One
looking only at the subscription revenue might mistakenly see prices
below cost.
Finally, a fourth problem is failure to understand the
technology underlying certain products. Once again, a prominent
example is ebooks, which have a much lower equilibrium price point
than do print books. Conventional books have a fairly common
mixture of fixed and variable costs. The latter includes per sale
royalties, production, shipment, and retailing. Ebooks dramatically
change that picture. Nearly all of the costs are fixed except for
royalties and very small distribution costs. As a result, the equilibrium
price point for ebooks is significantly lower than for print books.273
About the only significant variable cost is royalties, and as a result
many out-of-copyright ebooks are sold at a price of zero, even by
Amazon.274
The discussion of below cost pricing in the Apple ebooks case
bears this out. The district court concluded that for a time Amazon’s
price on ebooks was $9.99, roughly equal to its costs. However, at the
behest of Apple the publishers began raising their ebook prices to
Amazon while it continued to hold the line on its own prices. For a
time, Amazon’s prices on many ebooks fell below direct acquisition
costs.275 As a result of this Apple-induced change of policy, for a time
the publishers charged Amazon the same price for ebooks as for
conventional print books.276
That price charged by the publishers to Amazon was actually
the irrational one because it did not reflect the enormous difference in
variable costs that the publishers encountered in making the two types
of sales. In addition, the publishers agreed with each other to combat
Amazon’s aggressive pricing program by delaying the release of books
in an ebook format, a process that they called “windowing” –
something they believed they could accomplish only if they acted in
273

On the relevant economics, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and
Information Technologies, 68 Fl.L.Rev. 419, 437-445 (2016).
274
For good discussion, see John B. Kirkwood, Collusion to Control A
Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy, 69 UNIV.
MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2014).
275
See United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F.Supp.2d 638, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
276
Id. at 650.
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concert.277 The very one-sided discussions of the entire episode in
some of the literature fails to mention these things. It was Amazon,
not the publishers, who was attempting to push the price of ebooks
toward a more competitive equilibrium that reflected their true
distribution costs.
None of this is to say that Amazon, Uber, or any other digital
platform has not engaged in predatory pricing. But such claims need
a coherent theory and factual support, and so far these are in short
supply.

Exclusionary Patent Practices
It is no secret that the patent system does not work equally well
in every industry. It performs best in traditional technologies including
plant and equipment, chemicals, and other durable non-electronic
products. As it moves into information technologies, however,
particularly computers and the internet, cellular phones, nearly any
type of electronics or any field in which digital networking is a
dominant feature, it works much more poorly. Indeed, some studies
indicate that its value in many of these technologies is actually
negative.278 Aside from statutory recognition of design patents and
plant protection, however,279 the statutory system is unitary.
Antitrust law is also uniform in this sense across industry.
Except for a few markets with regulatory immunities, the same
antitrust law applies apply to all technologies. Antitrust has done a far
better job than patent law, however of accommodating its own rule
making to the differential demands of different industries.

277

Id. at 651.
JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 25–27,
151–61, 187–88, 246–57 (2008). On the range of differential applications in
different industries, see John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, and David L.
Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System, 82 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (2015).
279
35 U.S.C. §161 et seq (plants) (2018); 35 U.S.C. §171 et seq (design
patents) (2018).
278
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The antitrust community today is deeply divided on the subject
of the appropriate relationship between antitrust law and IP rights,
particularly patents. Part of it – but only a part – is reflected in the
debate over FRAND and patents recounted above.280 At risk of
overgeneralization, those on the right tend to favor strong patents and
other IP rights, and would generally resolve conflicts in favor of IP
protection, even in cases of fairly clear consumer harm.281 This
position was reflected in the Trump administration Justice
Department’s announcement of its “New Madison” doctrine, declaring
that antitrust law should generally stay out of patent licensing disputes
regarding standard essential patents.282 The DOJ chose to side with
Qualcomm and against the FTC in an important decision in which both
exclusion of rivals and higher prices were largely undisputed.283
This dispute cannot properly be characterized as one about the
importance of innovation. Most people presumably believe that
innovation is important and wise antitrust policy should operate to
facilitate it rather than undermine it. The dispute lies in a different
place, which has to do with two things. First is the role of patents in
furthering innovation. Second is the value of antitrust as a tool for
identifying restraints that limit innovation unnecessarily, or else that
limit competition without doing anything to further innovation. The
New Madison doctrine says, in essence, that antitrust has no role here.

280

See discussion supra, text at notes __.
One example is the dissenting opinion in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S.
136, 160, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, stating that goal of antitrust
laws is to promote “consumer welfare” but then voting to approve a patent
settlement that would have led to enormous price increases in drugs based on
doubtful patents).
282
Makan Delrahim, “The New Madison Approach to Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law” (March 16, 2018), available at Assistant Attorney
General Makan Delrahim Delivers Keynote Address at University of
Pennsylvania Law School | OPA | Department of Justice. For a critique, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, The DOJ’s “New Madison’ Doctrine Disregards Both
the Economics and the Law of Innovation, PROMARKET (Sep.8, 2021),
available
at
https://promarket.org/2021/09/08/doj-madison-doctrineantitrust-innovation/.
283
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). See discussion
supra, text at notes __.
281
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Patents are granted in a largely ex parte proceeding involving
the applicant and an examiner. The result is severe overissuance,
which is strongly indicated by the fact that when these patents are
subject to even the very limited adversarial review conducted through
the PTAB inter partes reexamination process, a clear majority of them
fail in whole or in part.284 Furthermore, the PTAB process does not
even cover questions of infringement, as opposed to validity.
Depending on the technology, determining a patent’s scope can be just
as difficult as determining its validity. While patents enjoy a statutory
presumption of validity when they are challenged in court, the
presumption is defeated for at least some claims in most of the cases.
These facts suggest that a doctrine like New Madison
constitutes serious overreaching in favor of patent protection at the
expense, not only of competition policy but also of innovation. That
is clearly the case with respect to information technologies, where the
rate of patent failure is very high and that was the focus of the New
Madison doctrine. For that reason President Biden was wise to issue
a new set of Guidelines for the licensing of standard-essential patents
that decisively reject the doctrine.285
Another important factor in this calculus is that antitrust today
is in a better place than patent law is. For all of the divisions over
antitrust policy there still remains a greater amount of consensus over
the conditions facilitating or undermining competition under constant
technology than there is over the conditions facilitating or undermining
innovation. In any event, antitrust challenges to patent practices are
virtually never simple challenges to basic patent validity or coverage.
Those issues are determined by the Patent Act and the PTAB process
and not subject to antitrust challenge except in a few cases involving

284

See, e.g., Christian Helmers & Brian J. Love, Patent Validity and
Litigation: Evidence from U.S. Interpartes Review (SSRN Working Paper
June
29,
2021),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720709.
285

At this writing the Guidelines are in draft form. See Department of Justice,
United States Patent and Trademark Office, and National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Draft Policy Statement on Licensing negotiations and Remedies for
Standard-Essential Patent Subject to Voluntary F/Rand Commitments (Dec. 6,
2021), available at SEP Policy Statement (justice.gov).
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such things as patents that were improperly obtained.286 Most of the
challenges are to licensing or acquisition practices that are not
addressed by the Patent Act itself, which states only that patents are to
be treated as personal property and then provides for licensing.287
Personal property is, after all, what most of antitrust enforcement is
about.
This is an area where antitrust law’s institutional superiority
comes in. Antitrust has had decades of practice weighing the diverse
set of issues that go into determining whether a particular practice is
anticompetitive. In very sharp contrast, patent law tends to focus
exclusively on validity and scope, competition be damned.288
The irony is that one of the things that has made FRAND so
valuable is that it has enabled limited recognition of the differences
between information technology patents and more traditional patents
– something that the patent act itself does not recognize. FRAND is a
voluntary mechanism through which participants in certain
informational and networked technologies have agreed to a patent
regime which is “weaker” than the one that we generally apply via the
Patent Act. None of the provisions of those agreements are inconsistent
with the Patent Act; they merely involve patentees who forego rights
that they are entitled to bargain away. In particular, they have agreed
that they will not refuse to license other participants regardless of
competitive relationship, and that they will accede to royalty
determinations guided by impartial tribunals.
Instead, the now defunct “New Madison” doctrine was a
heavy-handed approach to force FRAND patents arising in some of
the most innovative of industries into the same mold that has guided
more traditional patent law and produced much weaker results.

286

Walker Process Equip., Inc. v Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965) (filing of patent infringement action by one who knew the patent
to be invalid could meet the conduct requirement for a §2 violation).
287
35 U.S.C. §261 (2018).
288
E.g., Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firecly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (permitting patentee to obtain injunction on unpracticed patent because
the rival was a competitor in the product market).
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Conclusion
Because of its relative isolation from common law doctrine and
complete lack of specificity, §2 of the Sherman Act has left courts
more interpretive freedom than any other antitrust statute – or for that
matter, more than almost any other provision in United States code. A
very simple and nontechnical model of economics has been its
predominant but hardly exclusive guide. Whether one agrees with or
appreciates that assessment, one thing that seems clear is that antitrust
policy respecting dominant firms cannot be coherent without
understanding the likely consequences of the practices that it is
evaluating.
Lack of specificity is also key to §2’s flexibility, however, both
as to the range of markets and firms to which it applies and its ability
to create frameworks for analyzing practices. In general, this language
will accommodate virtually everything it needs to, with one important
limitation. A fair reading of the “monopolizing” provision is that it
does not prohibit conduct that is anticompetitive but that falls short of
threatening monopoly in a complementary or other related market.
This has become a much bigger problem than it was decades ago,
because networking and the interlinking of products and markets has
become a much more prominent feature of the economy. For that, a
properly constrained “abuse of dominance” standard would be
superior.
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